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The ongoing wave of corporate inversions has 
generated substantial debate in academic, 
business, and policy circles. Inversions are cross-
border acquisitions in which a U.S. corporation 
acquires a foreign target in such a manner that the 
foreign corporation emerges as the parent of the 
group that includes the U.S. corporation as a 
wholly owned subsidiary.
Critics of corporate inversions have described 
inverting companies as “unpatriotic”1 and as 
shirking their obligations to pay their fair share of 
taxes,2 and have called for federal action to stem 
corporate inversions.3 Over its last few years, the 
Obama administration took a series of steps to 
prevent more U.S. corporations from inverting.4 
Most recently, on April 4, 2016, Treasury released 
two sets of proposed and temporary regulations 
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In this report, Knoll argues that the inversion 
situation is more nuanced, complex, and 
ambiguous than Edward D. Kleinbard 
acknowledges, and he challenges Kleinbard’s 
claim that U.S. multinationals are on a tax par 
with their foreign competitors.
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1
E.g., Max Baucus, “Corporate Tax Shelters: Looking Under the 
Roof,” Senate Finance Committee Hearing, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 1:
Some prominent U.S. companies are literally re-incorporating 
offshore tax havens in order to avoid U.S. taxes. They are, in 
effect, renouncing their U.S. citizenship to cut their taxes. A 
partner in one of the firms marketing these so-called “inversion 
deals” admitted that some companies may be concerned that it 
is unpatriotic to abandon their U.S. corporate citizenship, but 
she went on to say that some companies are coming to the 
conclusion that “the improvement on earnings is powerful 
enough that maybe the patriotism issue needs to take a back 
seat.” You heard that right: “Maybe the patriotism issue needs 
to take a back seat.” Obviously, very troubling, especially now 
as we all try to pull together, most particularly since September 
11, as a nation and work together to help our people meet the 
problems that we are facing.
2
E.g., in reference to inversions, Rep. Peter Welch, D-Vt., quoted 
in Renae Merle’s article, “Obama Criticizes Companies That Leave 
U.S. for Lower Taxes,” WashingtonPost.com, Apr. 5, 2016 (“We’re 
just hemorrhaging the resources that we need from companies to 
pay their fair share.”).
3
J. Clifton Fleming Jr. et al., “Getting Serious About Cross-
Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing an Analytical Framework,” 
93 N.C.L. Rev. 673, 678-680 (2015); and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
“Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social Responsibility,” 11 
N.Y.U.J.L. & Bus. 1 (2014).
4
For a recent explication of this history, see Donald J. Marples 
and Jane G. Gravelle, “Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and 
Mergers: Tax Issues,” Congressional Research Service report 
R43568 (Apr. 27, 2016).
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designed to discourage inversions. Two days 
later, Pfizer and Allergan announced that they 
were abandoning their proposed merger.
The derailed Pfizer-Allergan transaction was 
the largest corporate acquisition announced in 
2015 (with a total enterprise value of $160 billion 
and a total equity value of $152 billion). Had it 
been completed, the Pfizer-Allergan merger 
would have been the largest pharmaceutical 
transaction ever, the third largest corporate 
acquisition on record, and the largest corporate 
inversion to date.5 Under the merger agreement, 
Pfizer, a U.S. domiciliary and the larger of the two 
companies, would have become a subsidiary of 
Allergan, an Irish domiciliary, thus converting 
Pfizer from a U.S.-domiciled parent into a U.S.-
domiciled subsidiary of a foreign parent 
(Allergan).
To critics of inversions, the scuttled Pfizer-
Allergan transaction epitomizes why inversions 
need to be stopped. Pfizer holds $148 billion of 
untaxed profits abroad, which, if brought back to 
the United States, would incur a $35 billion tax 
liability.6 If, however, Pfizer had successfully 
inverted, it would have been able to get access to 
those earnings, which it could use to pay 
dividends or repurchase shares, without paying 
any U.S. corporate tax on those earnings.7 By some 
estimates, there is as much as $2.4 trillion in 
untaxed profits ($1 trillion of which is in cash) 
held abroad by U.S. corporations that could 
escape taxation if inversions were freely 
permitted.8 Also, some critics of inversions argue 
that inverted companies are less closely connected 
with the United States than are U.S. corporations 
that have not inverted and as a consequence, 
inverted companies are more likely to move their 
headquarters, employment, investment, and 
research and development away from the United 
States.9
In contrast with the critics of corporate 
inversions, who have generally applauded the 
federal government’s efforts to stem inversions (and 
frequently encouraged the government to go further 
to prevent them), managers of inverting 
corporations protest loudly, claiming they are not 
the villains they have been made out to be, but 
rather are the victims of an unfair and antiquated 
U.S. tax system that dates from a time when 
business was much more national than 
international.10 These managers blame the U.S. tax 
laws — which, they say, hamper their ability to 
compete with foreign rivals11 — and call for 
fundamental tax reform, including the elimination 
of U.S. taxation of active foreign income.12 At the 
5
Leslie Picker, “How the Pfizer-Allergan Deal Ranks,” New 
York Times Dealbook, Nov. 23, 2015 (the equity value of Pfizer-
Allergan deal is $152 billion, which makes the deal the third largest 
deal by equity value after Vodafone AirTouch’s $183 billion 
takeover of Mannesmann of Germany and AOL’s $165 billion 
purchase of Time Warner).
6
Americans for Tax Fairness, Pfizer: Price Gouger, Tax Dodger 5, 
Table 1 (2016).
7
Id. at 4-6. Americans for Tax Fairness further argues that Pfizer 
is not hampered by its tax situation, but that its effective tax rate is 
actually quite low, closer to 7.5 percent than the 25.4 percent that 
Pfizer claims, once an adjustment is made for deferred taxes on 
overseas earnings. Id. at 4.
8
Citizens for Tax Justice, “Fortune 500 Companies Hold a 
Record $2.4 Trillion Offshore” (Mar 3, 2016) ($2.4 trillion 
unrepatriated profits of U.S. MNCs); Eric Platt, “Top 50 Boardroom 
Hoarders Sit on $1 Trillion in Cash,” Financial Times, May 11, 2015 
(citing a company analysis that U.S. companies hold about $1.1 
trillion in cash overseas). Those earnings are often said to be 
“locked out” of the United States. For thoughtful analysis of what it 
means for earnings to be locked out, see Fadi Shaheen, 
“Understanding Lockout,” 69 Tax L. Rev. 231 (2016); and Shaheen, 
“The GAAP Lockout Effect and the Investment Behavior of 
Multinational Firms,” 67 Tax L. Rev. 211 (2014).
9
E.g., statement of Peter R. Merrill, principal, PwC, hearing 
before the Senate Finance Committee, 113th Cong., 2d Sess., at 7-8 
(July 22, 2014); and Jeff Malehorn, “Why Corporate Headquarters 
Matter to Chicago,” World Business Chicago, Feb. 16, 2016. See also 
Arturs Kalnins and Francine Lafontaine, “Too Far Away? The 
Effect of Distance to Headquarters on Business Establishment 
Performance,” 5 Am. Econ. J. 157 (2013) (distance from 
headquarters weakens monitoring, thereby encouraging 
companies to locate operations closer to their headquarters); and 
Vanessa Straus-Kahn and Xavier Vives, “Why and Where Do 
Headquarters Move?” IESE Business School CEPR working paper 
no. 650 (Sept. 2006) (noting the importance of headquarters 
agglomeration effects).
10
E.g., Walter Galvin, “Why Corporate Inversions Are All the 
Rage,” The Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2014.
11
Id. See also Bret Wells, “What Corporate Inversions Teach 
About International Tax Reform,” Tax Notes, June 21, 2010, p. 1345 
(arguing that the corporate inversions provide “clear and 
noncontroversial evidence” that non-U.S. MNCs have a tax 
advantage over U.S.-domiciled MNCs in both U.S. and foreign 
markets).
12
E.g., Galvin, supra note 10.
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center of their complaint, U.S. corporations claim 
that they are taxed more heavily than their foreign 
rivals on the same income.13 By inverting, U.S.-
domiciled companies avoid the U.S. tax system’s 
disadvantageous treatment of resident businesses 
and place themselves on the same footing as their 
overseas competitors. Accordingly, the desire of 
Pfizer and other U.S.-domiciled corporations to 
invert is a signal that the U.S. international tax 
system is punitive in its treatment of U.S. 
corporations and needs to be reformed so U.S.-
based multinational corporations (MNCs) will not 
want to shift their domiciles.14
Proponents of this view argue that if U.S. 
companies are prevented from inverting through 
transactions in which the U.S. parent retains 
control, they would instead become takeover 
targets for foreign corporations as long as the U.S. 
tax system continues to favor foreign ownership 
over domestic ownership of corporate assets. 
Thus, unless and until the U.S. federal 
government is ready for fundamental tax reform, 
the unintended but foreseeable effect of 
discouraging inversions is to encourage foreign 
takeovers of U.S. companies.15 Moreover, 
takeovers would likely produce larger shifts in 
headquarters, employment, investment, and R&D 
away from the United States than would 
inversions.16
As the above arguments suggest, the central 
factual issue in the debate between proponents of 
stricter anti-inversion rules and their critics is 
whether the U.S. tax laws disadvantage U.S. 
domiciled companies relative to their foreign 
competitors. Proponents of stricter anti-inversion 
rules generally deny there is any such 
disadvantage. Accordingly, stricter anti-inversion 
rules would not hamper U.S.-domiciled 
companies in their competition against foreign 
rivals and would not encourage foreign 
companies to acquire U.S. companies. In contrast, 
the opponents of stricter anti-inversion rules 
generally accept that there is a disadvantage. 
Accordingly, tightening those rules (without 
engaging in fundamental tax reform to eliminate 
the tax disadvantage) would make it more 
difficult for U.S. companies to compete and 
encourage foreign takeovers of U.S. companies.
In a 2014 article,17 Professor Edward D. 
Kleinbard leaped into the center of that debate. In 
that article, he contended that competitiveness 
arguments for corporate inversions are “almost 
entirely fact-free”18 and constitute “a false 
narrative,”19 and that “international business 
‘competitiveness’ has nothing to do with the 
reasons for these deals.”20 He concluded that 
although the current U.S. tax system “is highly 
distortive and inefficient . . . one of the few 
deficiencies it has avoided is imposing an unfair 
international business tax competitive burden on 
sophisticated U.S. multinationals.”21
Kleinbard and his article have played and 
continue to play a highly visible role in public 
policy debates over inversions. His article has 
been cited for the propositions that U.S.-
domiciled companies are not tax-disadvantaged 
relative to their foreign competitors and that U.S.-
domiciled companies do not improve their 
competitive position by inverting.22 Kleinbard is 
also one of the authors of a September 25, 2015, 
letter to Congress signed by 24 international tax 
experts urging lawmakers not to align the United 
States’ international tax system more closely to 
those of other major advanced economies by 
13
Joshua Simpson, “Analyzing Corporate Inversions and 
Proposed Changes to the Repatriation Rule,” 68 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. 
Am. L. 673, 703 (2013). See also Wells, supra note 11.
14
See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, “Reluctantly, Patriot Flees 
Homeland for Greener Tax Pastures,” The New York Times, July 14, 
2014 (discussing testimony of Mylan CEO Heather Bresch); and 
Wells, supra note 11.
15
Testimony of Michelle Hanlon, the Howard W. Johnson 
Professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management, before the 
House Ways and Means Committee, at 3-4 (Feb. 24, 2016). See also 
Merrill, supra note 9.
16
Hanlon, supra note 15, at 6-8. See also Merrill, supra note 9.
17
Edward D. Kleinbard, “‘Competitiveness’ Has Nothing to Do 
With It,” Tax Notes, Sept. 1, 2014, p. 1055.
18
Id. at 1056.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 1055.
21
Id. at 1061.
22
E.g., Avi-Yonah and Omri Y. Marian, “Inversions and 
Competitiveness: Reflections in the Wake of Pfizer-Allergan,” 41 
Int’l Tax J. 39, 40 (Nov.-Dec. 2015) (“This inversion, in our opinion, 
provides the clearest rebuke to the frequently made argument that 
the reason for the wave of inversions is that the U.S. corporate tax 
system is uncompetitive. We agree with Professor Edward 
Kleinbard that ‘competitiveness has nothing to do with it.’”); 
Marian, “Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions,” 90 Wash. 
L. Rev. 1, 10 n.44 (2015) (directing readers to see Kleinbard’s article 
“for a full-blown rebuttal of the argument according to which 
inversions are driven by competitiveness concerns”).
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exempting the active foreign income of U.S. 
MNCs, advocating instead that the United States 
move its international tax system further away 
from those of its major trading partners by 
adopting “a true worldwide tax system — 
without deferral.”23 One of the rationales offered 
by the letter’s signatories for their proposal is that 
U.S. MNCs are not at a tax-induced competitive 
disadvantage relative to their foreign rivals.24
In this report, I offer a response to Kleinbard. I 
argue that the situation is more nuanced, complex, 
and ambiguous than he acknowledges, that his 
claim that U.S. MNCs are on a tax par with their 
foreign competitors is not well supported, and that 
attaining a more level playing field is one — albeit 
not the only — plausible rationale for inversions.25
Ultimately, the claim that U.S. MNCs are on a 
tax par with their foreign rivals is an empirical 
claim. Unfortunately, there is little, if any, 
empirical work directly determining whether 
U.S.-based MNCs are tax-advantaged, tax-
disadvantaged, or roughly on par with their 
foreign rivals and measuring the amount by 
which, if any, U.S.-based MNCs improve their 
competitive position by inverting.26 As a result, 
one cannot at this time clearly and convincingly 
describe the magnitude or even the direction of 
any such advantage or disadvantage, let alone the 
effect of inverting. That said, the stronger case 
would seem to be that U.S.-domiciled 
corporations are often tax-disadvantaged relative 
to their non-U.S. rivals and that they can improve 
their competitive position by inverting. In other 
words, not only has Kleinbard not established his 
claim that U.S. companies are not at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to their foreign rivals, that 
claim is more likely than not wrong.
I. Improving Competitiveness Abroad
However, before responding directly to 
Kleinbard’s arguments, I briefly set forth the two 
closely connected arguments to which he is 
responding: (1) that U.S. international tax law 
hampers the competitiveness of U.S.-based MNCs 
relative to that of non-U.S.-based MNCs and (2) 
that U.S. corporations, by inverting, eliminate or 
reduce that disadvantage. The first argument 
begins with the recognition that the United States 
is unique among G-8 countries (and an outlier 
among large, market-oriented economies) in that 
it taxes the worldwide income of its corporations 
(with a tax credit for taxes paid to foreign 
governments on that income27).28 Under U.S. law, 
the active non-U.S. income earned directly by a 
U.S. corporation (or by a branch, an 
unincorporated entity owned by a U.S. 
corporation) is taxed by the United States as it is 
earned, whereas the active foreign income earned 
by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent 
corporation is taxed by the United States only 
when that income is repatriated to the United 
States.29 Thus, the U.S. tax system encourages U.S. 
companies with foreign-source income that has 
not been taxed at a rate as high as the U.S. tax rate 
to earn income through a foreign corporation and 
defer repatriation. It is, however, costly for U.S. 
companies to defer U.S. taxes by avoiding 
repatriation.30 Accordingly, some U.S. MNCs 
repatriate and pay the U.S. corporate tax (at which 
point they can use the money as they see fit), 
whereas other U.S. MNCs defer repatriation and 
23
Americans for Tax Fairness, “24 International Tax Experts 
Address Current Tax Reform Efforts in Congress,” at 3 (Sept. 25, 
2015).
24
Id. at 2 (“there is no factual basis for the assertion that U.S. 
multinationals cannot compete globally because of the U.S. tax 
system”).
25
Kleinbard is not the only proponent of the view that 
competitiveness concerns are not a reason for inversions. Other 
scholars have also argued that U.S. MNCs are not at a tax-induced 
disadvantage relative to their non-U.S. competitors. See, e.g., 
Marian, “Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform 
Discourse in the United States,” 32 Va. Tax. Rev. 133, 165-167 (2012) 
(discussing a hearing with statements from Avi-Yonah); Fleming, 
Robert J. Peroni, and Stephen E. Shay, “Worse Than Exemption,” 59 
Emory L.J. 79 (2009) (arguing that the United States’ tax treatment of 
foreign income is more generous than the taxation of foreign 
income under territorial taxation).
26
See testimony of Leslie Robinson, associate professor, Tuck 
School of Business at Dartmouth University, before the Finance 
Committee, “The U.S. Tax Code: Love It, Leave It, or Reform It!” 
(July 22, 2014).
27
Sections 901-904 (provides a tax credit for foreign taxes paid 
up to the U.S. tax liability on that income).
28
Philip Dittmer, “A Global Perspective on Territorial Taxation,” 
Tax Foundation special report No. 202, at 2 (Aug. 10, 2012) (of the 
34 OECD member countries, the number of countries that had 
worldwide tax systems declined from 17 in 2000 to seven in 2010; 
as of 2010, the only OECD states that had worldwide systems were 
Chile, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, and the United 
States).
29
Section 954(c).
30
See infra discussion.
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incur the implicit tax costs of doing so and any 
explicit taxes (such as having to pay U.S. tax on 
interest earnings).
In contrast with the United States and its 
worldwide tax system, most countries use 
territorial tax systems that exempt the active 
foreign income of domestic corporations. 
Accordingly, the argument goes, U.S. 
corporations are subject to higher taxes than are 
many of their competitors on income from non-
U.S. sources. Moreover, because corporations 
(regardless of domicile) raise capital in a global 
marketplace, they must pay investors the same 
(risk-adjusted) rate of return for their capital.31 
Thus, the U.S. taxes that a U.S.-based MNC pays 
on its foreign-source income are essentially a toll 
charge, an incremental tax that is paid when 
capital holders invest in the equity of projects that 
produce non-U.S. income through U.S. 
corporations rather than through non-U.S. 
corporations.32 Because U.S. MNCs must earn a 
higher before-tax rate of return than their foreign 
rivals to achieve the same rate of return after 
payment of corporate taxes, the toll charge raises 
investment hurdle rates on non-U.S. investments 
for U.S. corporations relative to hurdle rates for 
foreign corporations, thus rendering U.S. MNCs 
less competitive than their foreign rivals in non-
U.S. markets.33 This is the outbound argument 
that U.S. tax law reduces the competitiveness of 
U.S.-domiciled MNCs.
The argument that inversions are a rational 
response to that disadvantage begins by 
recognizing that U.S. tax law considers a 
corporation to be domiciled where it is 
incorporated (regardless of the extent of its 
activities in that location).34 Thus, a corporation 
incorporated in the United States is a U.S. 
corporation and is subject to worldwide taxation 
on its income; in contrast, a corporation 
incorporated outside the United States is a non-
U.S. corporation and is subject to U.S. taxation 
only on its income from U.S. sources. Moreover, if 
a non-U.S. corporation is domiciled in a country 
that has a territorial tax system, it generally will 
not pay home-country tax on active income 
earned outside its home jurisdiction.
Following an inversion, the parent of the 
group is a non-U.S. corporation; however, the U.S. 
corporation that inverted is still a U.S. 
corporation. As before the inversion, non-U.S.-
source income earned directly by a U.S. 
corporation is subject to immediate U.S. taxation, 
whereas non-U.S.-source income earned by a 
subsidiary of a U.S. corporation is subject to U.S. 
tax when that income is repatriated by the U.S. 
corporation. Accordingly, if this were all that 
there were to an inversion, inversions would not 
ameliorate the tax disadvantage incurred by U.S. 
corporations. That is because the foreign income 
earned by U.S. corporations and their subsidiaries 
would still be subject to tax by the United States.35
However, following an inversion, corporate 
groups often use a variety of tax planning 
techniques to shift income that would otherwise 
be taxed by the United States to the non-U.S. 
parent (or to non-U.S. corporations that are not 
subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation) in order to 
avoid ever subjecting that income to tax by the 
United States. These tactics include shifting 
income from subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation to 
corporations that are not subsidiaries of a U.S. 
corporation,36 allowing the businesses operated 
by subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation to wither 
31
There is a strand of academic literature combining taxation 
and corporate governance that views the U.S. worldwide tax 
system as the price for the U.S. corporate governance system. E.g., 
Mitchell A. Kane and Edward B. Rock, “Corporate Taxation and 
International Charter Competition,” 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1229 (2008); 
and Eric L. Talley, “Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of 
Regulatory Competition,” 101 Va. L. Rev. 1649 (2015). However, 
most of the tax literature on inversions implicitly assumes that the 
corporate governance benefits of incorporating in the United States 
are small or nonexistent.
32
Corporations that fund their investments using third-party 
debt are not disadvantaged to the extent they use that capital. 
Because interest payments are deductible, the earnings on that 
capital are not taxed at the corporate level, so differential taxation 
of corporations domiciled in different jurisdictions does not affect 
their cash flow from third-party debt. Internal debt is different 
because the income remains within the corporate group.
33
Readers familiar with the academic literature on capital 
ownership neutrality might recognize the argument.
34
A notable exception to this general rule is section 7874, which 
treats a foreign corporation as a U.S. corporation if the owners of 
the U.S. corporation own more than 80 percent of the combined 
entity after a merger of a U.S. corporation and a foreign 
corporation.
35
The foreign income earned by the foreign parent not through 
the U.S. corporation would escape U.S. tax, but that income was 
not subject to U.S. tax before the inversion and would not have 
been subject to U.S. tax had the MNCs not merged. However, that 
income would be subject to U.S. tax if the U.S. MNC acquired the 
foreign MNC.
36
Transfer pricing restrictions are imperfect.
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while growing the businesses operated by 
subsidiaries of the foreign parent,37 and 
extensively using borrowing and other 
“hopscotch techniques” that shift cash and 
income from foreign subsidiaries of the U.S. 
corporation to the foreign parent without passing 
through the U.S. corporation.38 To the extent that 
those tactics are effective, the foreign-source 
income of the U.S. corporation is, after the 
inversion, no longer subject to U.S. tax. That, in 
turn, reduces the hurdle rate on foreign 
investments and, with it, the tax-induced 
competitive disadvantage experienced by U.S. 
corporations in foreign markets.
The above represents what could be called the 
outbound account for how the U.S. worldwide tax 
system disadvantages U.S. companies in the 
competition to earn income in foreign markets, 
and how inversions operate as a self-help 
mechanism that U.S. corporations use to achieve 
territorial taxation and hence eliminate the 
disadvantage. The outbound account described 
above is the principal target at which Kleinbard 
takes aim in his 2014 article. Moreover, of the two 
arguments described above — first, that the U.S. 
worldwide tax system places U.S.-based MNCs at 
a competitive disadvantage relative to their 
foreign rivals, and second, that inversions are 
effective in eliminating that disadvantage — 
Kleinbard takes issue with the first argument 
only. He would seem to accept that inversions 
could be used to improve the competitiveness of 
U.S. MNCs relative to their foreign rivals if it were 
correct that U.S. MNCs are at a tax-induced 
disadvantage relative to foreign MNCs.39
Before addressing Kleinbard’s arguments, 
however, there are several aspects of the 
outbound account of how the U.S. tax system 
disadvantages U.S. corporations in competition 
with non-U.S. corporations in foreign markets 
that warrant attention. First and most obviously, 
the claim is comparative. The claim takes the form 
that U.S. corporations are taxed more heavily than 
their foreign rivals on their earnings in foreign 
markets, and so they have a more difficult time 
competing in those markets than their foreign 
rivals. Thus, at its heart, Kleinbard’s claim is that 
U.S.-based MNCs are taxed no higher than their 
foreign rivals.
Second, the comparatively high U.S. statutory 
corporate tax rate of 35 percent (the highest 
among OECD countries) does not enter directly 
into the argument that the U.S. tax system 
disadvantages U.S.-domiciled MNCs relative to 
their foreign rivals. The relatively high U.S. 
corporate tax rate exacerbates that disadvantage 
but does not cause it. The disadvantage comes 
from the U.S. worldwide tax system, which 
subjects foreign income to U.S. taxation, as long as 
the U.S. tax rate on that income exceeds the 
source-state tax on that income. Any incremental 
tax would have that effect, although the larger the 
tax, the larger the effect. Accordingly, but for 
deferral, which reduces the present value of the 
tax, the disadvantage faced by U.S. corporations 
would equal the difference between the U.S. 
statutory rate (35 percent) and the tax rate in the 
jurisdiction where the income is earned.
Third, as with all such comparative 
arguments, there is an implicit assumption that 
other considerations are equal. An obvious 
example here is the operation of states’ antiabuse 
(controlled foreign corporation) regimes, which 
have the potential to tax foreign income — 
especially income that is shifted across 
jurisdictions — at the parent corporation’s tax 
rate. This is an issue to which I return later.
Fourth, any claim to the effect that the U.S. tax 
system either does or does not disadvantage U.S. 
MNCs in their competition with foreign rivals is 
ultimately an empirical claim and potentially 
quantifiable. Establishing that claim requires 
articulating the basis on which companies make 
capital budgeting decisions, describing how the 
tax law affects those decisions, taking into account 
how parties structure their operations in light of 
the tax law, and then comparing results across 
jurisdictions for companies based in different 
jurisdictions.37Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1067.
38
Id. at 1065-1066. To some extent, these techniques have been 
curtailed over the last two years since publication of Kleinbard’s 
article. See Marples and Gravelle, supra note 4, at 6-13 (describing 
recent Treasury notices that have reduced some of the benefits of 
inversions).
39
That acceptance is as a factual matter, not as a policy matter.
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II. Improving Competitiveness at Home
The above represents what I have called the 
outbound account of inversions and 
competitiveness. Under that account, U.S.-
domiciled MNCs have an incentive to invert 
because an inversion improves their ability to 
compete with their foreign rivals outside the 
United States. There is a second argument that has 
been getting more attention recently, that U.S.-
based MNCs improve their competitive position 
in the United States by inverting. Under this 
account, inversions improve the ability of U.S. 
companies to compete with non-U.S.-based 
MNCs for investments in the United States.
The argument is as follows. The United States 
taxes all corporations, regardless of domicile, on 
their U.S.-source income — with large, successful 
businesses taxed at what is an effectively flat rate 
of 35 percent. Income, however, is a net concept, 
and all corporations regardless of domicile can, in 
calculating their net income, deduct their 
expenses against their gross income. Generally 
deductible expenses include royalties paid on 
licenses of intellectual property and interest paid 
on debt. Moreover, with some limitations, these 
expenses are deductible even if the royalties and 
interest payments are paid to the parent (or a 
corporation up the chain of ownership) of the U.S. 
corporation or another member of the same group 
of related corporations. As has long been 
recognized, interest and royalty payments are 
very effective in shifting the source of income for 
tax purposes but otherwise have no economic 
significance when transfers are made within the 
same group of companies (as long as the ultimate 
ownership is the same).
These and similar techniques, which range 
from the simple illustrations above to much more 
complex transactions with colorful names, such as 
the Double Dutch Irish sandwich, create what 
Kleinbard calls “stateless income.”40 Stateless 
income captures the notion that corporate 
managers have flexibility in determining where a 
corporation’s income is recognized for tax 
purposes.41 And economic studies show that 
corporations shift large amounts of taxable 
income from high-taxed states (where many 
income-producing activities and sales take place) 
to low-taxed states (where little economic activity 
and few sales occur).42
Although U.S.-based MNCs can and do shift 
income from within the United States to outside, 
there is an important difference when foreign-
based MNCs engage in income shifting and when 
U.S.-based MNCs do so. The difference is that 
when a U.S.-based MNC engages in such a shift, 
the income shifted out of the United States is still 
ultimately subject to U.S. worldwide taxation 
when it is repatriated back to the United States.43 
In contrast, once U.S.-source income has been 
successfully stripped out of the United States by a 
non-U.S.-domiciled corporation, the income can 
be repatriated back to the parent at no U.S. tax 
cost. Thus, a non-U.S. corporation that strips 
income out from the United States permanently 
escapes U.S. tax on that income. In contrast, a U.S. 
corporation that strips income out from the 
United States only defers (possibly indefinitely) 
that income from U.S. taxation.
Under U.S. tax law, it is relatively easy for 
non-U.S.-based MNCs to strip large amounts of 
income out of the United States, thereby 
completely and permanently escaping U.S. tax on 
that income at very little tax or economic cost. One 
simple technique is for the non-U.S. parent to 
capitalize the U.S. subsidiary with debt rather 
than equity. If the foreign parent were to capitalize 
the U.S. entity with equity, the income earned by 
the U.S. entity would be taxed in the United 
States. In contrast, to the extent the parent uses 
debt, the U.S. income is reduced by the interest 
payment, with the income generally taxed where 
the interest is received.44
40
Kleinbard, “Stateless Income,” 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699 (2011); 
Kleinbard, “The Lessons of Stateless Income,” 65 Tax L. Rev. 99 
(2011).
41
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1056.
42
E.g., Kevin S. Markle, “A Comparison of the Tax-Motivated 
Income Shifting of Multinationals in Territorial and Worldwide 
Countries,” 33 Contemp. Acct. Res. 7 (2016) (and sources cited 
within).
43
That income is also potentially subject to subpart F, which 
currently taxes income from passive investments held by CFCs of 
U.S.-domiciled corporations.
44
Section 163(j). The limit is effectively 50 percent of earnings 
before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization, leaving little 
taxable income after depreciation and amortization. Kleinbard, 
supra note 17, at 1066 (citing Martin A. Sullivan, “Untangling 
Corporate Effective Tax Rates,” Tax Notes, Mar. 16, 2015, p. 1299).
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A U.S.-domiciled MNC can also use debt to 
reduce its U.S. taxable income, but there is an 
important difference. When a U.S.-domiciled 
MNC shifts income out from the United States, 
that income is still subject to U.S. taxation when it 
is repatriated. For the interest payments on the 
debt to reduce a U.S.-domiciled corporation’s 
income ultimately subject to U.S. tax, the debt 
cannot come from the corporate parent or a 
related party. To strip the income permanently 
beyond the reach of U.S. taxation, the debt must 
come from a third party. When debt is provided 
by an unrelated third party rather than a related 
party, the borrower incurs the economic risks 
associated with debt. In contrast, when a U.S. 
subsidiary of a foreign parent is financed with 
debt from a foreign parent, there is no real 
economic difference between using debt or equity, 
as long as the parent holds the securities and thus 
the economic risks of debt are avoided.
Accordingly, there can be a substantial U.S. 
tax advantage from having a foreign-domiciled 
parent rather than a U.S.-domiciled parent. In 
those circumstances, non-U.S.-based MNCs will 
have a tax-induced competitive advantage over 
U.S. companies in the competition to own assets, 
make investments, and take advantage of 
opportunities in the United States. This, in turn, 
provides an incentive for U.S.-domiciled MNCs to 
invert to improve their competitiveness (not 
outside the United States, but rather) inside the 
United States.45
It follows that there are two potential 
competitiveness accounts that can be told about 
inversions. U.S.-based MNCs might invert to 
improve their ability to compete with their 
foreign rivals for opportunities outside the United 
States (the outbound account) or inside the United 
States (the inbound account). Moreover, these two 
accounts are largely independent of one another. 
Both might be true, either one might be true, or 
neither one might be true. Accordingly, it is 
possible that U.S. tax laws disadvantage U.S.-
based MNCs relative to their foreign rivals both 
without and within the United States. Although 
Kleinbard’s focus is on the outbound account, he 
also addresses the inbound account (although he 
does not describe it as a competitiveness 
concern).46 Following Kleinbard, I focus mostly on 
the outbound account, but I also consider the 
inbound account as his broad claim — that 
competitiveness has nothing to do with inversions 
— denies the possibility that either account is 
correct. I now turn to Kleinbard’s arguments for 
why those accounts are wrong.
III. Inversions and the Competitiveness of U.S. MNCs
Kleinbard’s 2014 article is erudite, witty, 
forceful, and wide-ranging. Yet, for all the 
complex issues and concepts Kleinbard addresses 
and the numerous contemporary business 
practices and academic studies he weaves into his 
narrative, the logical structure of Kleinbard’s 
main argument is straightforward. Kleinbard’s 
central claim is that U.S.-based MNCs are not at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to their foreign 
rivals. That claim, in turn, rests on the premise 
that when properly viewed through the lens 
through which businesses make investment or 
capital budgeting decisions, U.S.-based MNCs are 
taxed no heavier than their foreign rivals. As 
Kleinbard describes it:
Sophisticated U.S. firms operate today, not 
under a worldwide tax system, but rather 
in an ersatz territorial environment, 
without any of the antiabuse rules a 
thoughtful territorial tax system would 
impose, but subject to a bizarre constraint 
that they must park their foreign earnings 
offshore to remain within the ersatz 
territorial system. This means that in 
practice, U.S. firms do capture the benefit 
of operating in lower-tax jurisdictions, 
both as a cash matter and more 
importantly for the purpose of U.S. 
generally accepted accounting principles, 
which is the lens through which investors 
and corporate executives measure a firm’s 
performance.47
45
E.g., Wells, supra note 11, at 1352-1356.
46
See Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1066-1068.
47
Id. at 1056.
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Accordingly, because U.S.-domiciled MNCs 
are not at a tax-induced competitive disadvantage 
relative to their foreign rivals, Kleinbard 
concludes they cannot improve their relative 
position by inverting.
To advance his claim that U.S. tax law does not 
disadvantage U.S. MNCs in their competition 
with foreign rivals, Kleinbard purports to show 
that U.S. companies are not at a disadvantage 
from either a financial accounting perspective or a 
cash flow perspective. Thus, Kleinbard’s 
argument reduces to the claim that the tax rate on 
U.S. corporations’ non-U.S. income is non-
positive (zero or negative).48 Indeed, the claim that 
there is no disadvantage faced by U.S. companies 
is an argument that the incremental tax is not 
merely small, but that it is non-positive.
Moreover, Kleinbard’s main thesis in his 2014 
article, that the U.S. tax laws do not disadvantage 
U.S.-domiciled MNCs relative to their foreign 
rivals from either a financial accounting or cash 
flow perspective, implies the following four 
claims:
1. U.S.-domiciled MNCs are not 
disadvantaged relative to their foreign 
rivals from a financial accounting 
perspective in the competition to earn 
income in foreign markets (outbound/
financial accounting perspective);
2. U.S.-domiciled MNCs are not 
disadvantaged relative to their foreign 
rivals from a cash flow perspective in the 
competition to earn income in foreign 
markets (outbound/cash flow 
perspective);
3. U.S.-domiciled MNCs are not 
disadvantaged relative to their foreign 
rivals from a financial accounting 
perspective in the competition to earn 
income in the U.S. market (inbound/
financial accounting perspective); and
4. U.S.-domiciled MNCs are not 
disadvantaged relative to their foreign 
rivals from a cash flow perspective in the 
competition to earn income in the U.S. 
market (inbound/cash flow perspective).
In his 2014 article, Kleinbard argues that all 
four claims are true and that each claim is 
supported by the weight of evidence.
By making his case under both financial 
accounting and cash flow principles, Kleinbard is 
acknowledging the possibility that companies 
incorporate taxes into their business and 
investment decisions in different ways. Support 
for that divergence can be found in a manuscript 
posted after publication of Kleinbard’s article.
In a recent working paper, John R. Graham, 
Michelle Hanlon, Terry Shevlin, and Nemit Shroff 
surveyed tax executives at nearly 2,800 
corporations, most of which are domiciled in the 
United States, about how their companies 
incorporate tax considerations into their business 
decisions.49 The tax executives were asked under 
various circumstances what is the primary tax 
rate their respective companies use to incorporate 
taxes into their business decisions, and in each 
case they were given a choice of the following 
options: “(i) U.S. statutory tax rate [STR], (ii) 
[generally accepted accounting principles] 
effective tax rate [ETR], (iii) jurisdiction-specific 
[STR], (iv) jurisdiction-specific [ETR], (v) 
marginal tax rate [MTR], and (vi) other.”50 
Averaging across all responses of the 800 
responding companies, the surveys indicated the 
following pattern of choice of a primary tax rate: 
“25.8 percent use GAAP ETRs, 23.1 percent use 
STRs, 19.6 percent use jurisdiction-specific STRs, 
17.0 percent use jurisdiction-specific ETRs, 11.2 
percent use MTRs, and 3.2 percent use some other 
rate.”51 Thus, the most common tax rate to use is 
the GAAP ETR followed by the STR.52 Further, 
Graham et al. find that public companies are more 
48
There is an important qualification to this statement 
regarding antiabuse rules that I take up later in the discussion: 
whether U.S. MNCs face a tax disadvantage from a cash flow 
perspective.
49
Graham et al., “Tax Rates and Corporate Decision Making,” 
working paper (Mar. 2016) (roughly 750 companies provided 
usable responses).
50
Id. at 10.
51
Id. at 13. The use of jurisdiction-specific ETRs is slightly 
higher for mergers and acquisitions (20.1 percent) and slightly 
lower for investment decisions (16 percent). Id. at 45, Table 3, panel 
A.
52
Id. at 11.
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likely than private companies to use ETRs rather 
than STRs or MTRs;53 however, larger companies, 
high R&D-intensity companies, and companies 
with higher institutional ownership are more 
likely to use MTRs and less likely to use ETRs for 
decision-making.54 However, companies with 
large numbers of analysts following them are 
more likely to use ETRs and are less likely to use 
STRs or MTRs.55 Graham et al. interpret their 
results to mean “that companies are more likely to 
use the MTR and less likely to use the ETR when 
external monitoring mechanisms discipline 
managers and curb agency problems.”56
The recent work by Graham et al. 
demonstrates that there is no single method that 
all (or almost all) corporations use to incorporate 
taxes into their decision-making. Rather, their 
work suggests that there is substantial diversity in 
the way businesses incorporate taxes into their 
decision-making. Thus, some companies might 
use a financial accounting approach, whereas 
others use a cash flow approach, and still others 
likely use both approaches.57 Such a wide 
divergence in practice makes it difficult to 
describe precisely how taxes affect the capital 
budgeting decisions of U.S.-domiciled 
corporations, which in turn makes it more 
difficult to draw strong conclusions about how 
taxes affect the capital budgeting decisions of 
U.S.-domiciled MNCs relative to those of foreign-
domiciled MNCs. With this caveat in mind, I take 
the financial accounting (ETR) and cash flow 
(MTR) approaches in turn, assuming in each case 
that domestic and foreign MNCs incorporate 
taxes into their decision-making in the same 
manner (potentially differing only in the rates 
they use).
A. The Financial Accounting Claim
Although Kleinbard argues that U.S. MNCs 
do not face a competitiveness disadvantage from 
either an accounting or a cash flow perspective, he 
expends most of his effort developing the 
financial accounting claim. According to 
Kleinbard, GAAP “is the lens through which 
investors and corporate executives measure a 
firm’s performance.”58 There are two versions of 
Kleinbard’s financial statement argument.
The simpler version begins with the premise 
that both U.S.- and non-U.S.-based companies 
evaluate investments (including acquisitions) by 
applying their overall worldwide ETRs to 
expected earnings regardless of where those 
earnings arise and are taxed. According to this 
view, U.S. corporations are not at a competitive 
disadvantage because their overall ETRs are as 
low as (if not lower than) their non-U.S. rivals’ 
ETRs.
The more sophisticated version of the 
argument posits that companies apply market-
specific ETRs — rates that vary across national 
markets — to expected earnings. According to 
this view, U.S. corporations are not at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to their foreign 
rivals because U.S. companies have as low (if not 
lower) ETRs than do foreign companies in all 
national markets.
Although, at various places in his 2014 article, 
Kleinbard makes both arguments, he generally 
favors the more sophisticated argument on the 
ground that such an approach more closely 
reflects the manner in which companies make 
investment decisions. I begin with the simpler 
argument and then address the more 
sophisticated argument.
1. Global ETRs.
Kleinbard at times suggests that companies 
make investment decisions based on their global 
or overall ETR.59 From this perspective, according 
to Kleinbard, U.S.-based MNCs are not at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to their foreign 
53
Id. at 13.
54
Id. at 14-16.
55
Id. at 16.
56
Id. at 16-17.
57
Graham et al. asked tax executives what tax rate their 
business “primarily” used, making it unlikely that companies 
using more than one tax rate would indicate that they use multiple 
tax rates. Another potential problem with the study is that the 
authors asked tax managers what tax rate the company used to 
make various business and investment decisions. However, those 
decisions are not typically made by tax managers but rather by 
corporate investment or development officers.
58
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1056. Kleinbard also describes 
GAAP as “the lens through which all relevant private parties view 
a company.” Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1058.
59
For example, in his discussion of Emerson’s unsuccessful 
attempt to acquire American Power Conversion (APC), Kleinbard 
refers only to the companies’ global ETRs.
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rivals, and therefore, improving competitiveness 
cannot be a rationale for inverting because the 
overall ETRs of U.S.-based MNCs are as low if not 
lower than those of their rivals.60
This argument has the benefit that it rests on a 
few studies of global ETRs of corporations based 
in different states. According to Kleinbard, these 
studies show that U.S.-based MNCs do not have 
systematically higher ETRs than MNCs based in 
other nations61:
Whether one measures effective marginal 
or overall tax rates, sophisticated U.S. 
multinational firms are burdened by tax 
rates that are the envy of their 
international peers. And this is true 
whether one studies cash taxes paid or — 
more important in the case of public firms 
— U.S. GAAP accounting for taxes.62
In a March 16, 2015, Tax Notes column,63 
Martin A. Sullivan reviews three well-known 
economic studies of MNCs’ ETRs. Those studies 
are by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Yaron Lahav 
(2012),64 by Kevin Markle and Douglas 
Shackelford (2012),65 and by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011).66 All three 
studies sought to “measure under accounting 
rules, what the worldwide tax burden is of all the 
investments made by a corporation domiciled in 
country A compared with the same burden of a 
corporation domiciled in country B.67
The studies make these comparisons using 
different methods, data sources, and time periods. 
Nonetheless, all three studies conclude that the 
global ETR of the average U.S.-domiciled MNC 
either is no higher or is not substantially higher than 
that of the average non-U.S.-domiciled MNC. For 
example, the Avi-Yonah and Lahav study, which 
calculated global ETRs of the 100 largest U.S. and EU 
public companies from 2000 to 2010, found that the 
average profit-weighted global ETR for the 100 
largest U.S. public companies was 31 percent and for 
EU companies, the corresponding average was 35 
percent, a 4 percent advantage for the U.S. 
corporations. The PwC study, which calculated 
global ETRs for 2,000 companies in 59 countries 
between 2006 and 2009, found that the profit-
weighted U.S. average global ETR was 27.7 percent, 
that the unweighted average of global ETRs for the 
other 58 countries was 19.5 percent, and that when 
each country was weighted by GDP, the average 
global ETR of non-U.S. MNCs went up to 24.8 
percent. Weighting each country by the number of 
observations raised the average global ETR of non-
U.S. MNCs further to 25.4 percent, still 2 percent 
below the U.S. average.68 The Markle-Shackelford 
study, which calculated global ETRs for 11,000 
companies domiciled in 82 countries, using data 
from between 2005 through 2009, found that the 
profit-weighted average global ETR of U.S. 
domiciled MNCs was 25.9 percent, the unweighted 
average global ETR of foreign jurisdiction MNCs 
was 20 percent, and the GDP weighted average was 
25.2 percent — 0.7 percent less than the U.S. average. 
Accordingly, because all three studies conclude that 
the global ETR of the average U.S. MNC is either no 
higher than or only slightly higher than that of the 
average non-U.S. MNC, these three studies would 
all seem to support the argument that U.S.-
domiciled MNCs do not face a tax-induced 
competitive disadvantage than their foreign rivals. 
However, a closer look at these studies leans in the 
opposite direction.
60
Avi-Yonah and Lahav, “The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest 
U.S. and EU Multinationals,” 6 Tax L. Rev. 375 (2012); statement of 
Avi-Yonah before the Ways and Means Committee, “How Other 
Countries Have Used Tax Reform to Help Their Companies 
Compete in the Global Market and Create Jobs,” 112th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (May 24, 2011). Avi-Yonah and Marian make this argument as 
well in connection with the Pfizer-Allergan transaction. Avi-Yonah 
and Marian, supra note 22, at 40.
61
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1057.
62
Id.
63
Sullivan, supra note 44.
64
Avi-Yonah and Lahav, supra note 60.
65
Markle and Douglas A. Shackelford, “Cross-Country 
Comparisons of Corporate Income Taxes,” 65 Nat’l Tax J. 493 (2012).
66
PwC, “Global Effective Tax Rates” (Apr. 14, 2011).
67
Sullivan, supra note 44, at 1301.
68
In a blog post, Kleinbard criticized the PwC study. See Paul 
Caron, “Kleinbard Critiques PwC Effective Tax Rate Study,” 
TaxProf Blog, Apr. 18, 2011. One of Kleinbard’s criticisms is that 
simple comparisons of global ETRs overstate the tax burden on 
U.S. companies relative to the burden on non-U.S. companies 
because the United States imposes a higher statutory tax rate but 
taxes on a smaller base as the result of accelerated depreciation and 
other faster write-offs. Although accurate as a characterization of 
the difference between U.S. and non-U.S. tax systems, the criticism 
seems misplaced for a study that is explicitly about global ETRs, 
not cash taxes. PwC, supra note 66, at 2 (describing method of 
study). It is also a surprising criticism to see from Kleinbard, who 
argues that the GAAP effects of taxation are more important than 
cash flow consequences of taxation, especially for public 
companies. Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1056-1057. Of course, as 
Kleinbard describes at some length, timing differences do not 
reduce global ETRs. Id. at 1058-1060.
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Although a corporation might do business in 
many countries, it is domiciled in only one 
country. The Avi-Yonah-Lahav study compares 
companies domiciled in the United States with 
those domiciled in Europe and compares the U.S. 
average global ETR to the European average 
global ETR. In contrast, the Markle-Shackelford 
and PwC studies calculate average global ETRs 
for MNCs domiciled in each country in the study. 
The following table, taken directly from Sullivan’s 
column, provides average calculated global ETRs 
for MNCs domiciled in different jurisdictions, 
including the United States.
Looking at Table 1, we see that the lowest 
average global ETRs are for MNCs domiciled in 
nations with small populations and little 
economic activity (except for tourism and 
finance), such as Bermuda and the Cayman 
Islands. MNCs domiciled in industrial nations 
have substantially higher global ETRs. Among 
industrial nations, Japan is an outlier. MNCs 
domiciled in Japan, with ETRs in the mid-30 
percent range, face the highest ETRs by far. 
Depending on the study, MNCs domiciled in the 
United States face either the second highest 
(Markle-Shackelford — 25.9 percent) or third 
highest (PwC — 27.7 percent) average global 
ETRs. According to PwC, German-domiciled 
MNCs face slightly higher average global ETRs 
than do U.S. MNCs (27.9 percent), whereas the 
Markle-Shackelford study concludes that German 
MNCs face global ETRs 4 percent lower than U.S. 
MNCs (21.9 percent).69 For the other 10 
jurisdictions covered in the table, including 
Australia, Canada, France, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, both the 
Markle-Shackelford and PwC studies conclude 
that MNCs domiciled in those nations face lower 
average global ETRs than their U.S. counterparts. 
Thus, it would appear that U.S.-domiciled MNCs 
face among the highest ETRs of companies 
domiciled in any country. Accordingly, if the 
impact of taxes on a company’s competitiveness 
can be measured by the company’s global ETR, 
U.S.-domiciled MNCs appear to be at a tax 
disadvantage relative to MNCs domiciled in 
many other jurisdictions. That is because U.S.-
domiciled MNCs have higher average global 
ETRs than MNCs domiciled in most other 
advanced economies.
Further, in 2013 Markle and Shackelford 
updated their earlier study of global ETRs by 
extending their data through 2011 and reached 
similar conclusions.70 They summarize their main 
result as follows:
Table 1. Comparison From 2 Studies of
Financial Accounting ETRs
(across 14 jurisdictions and the United States)
Jurisdiction PwC
Markle-
Shackelford
Australia 27.1% 22%
Bermuda 18.4% 11.4%
Canada 21.6% 17.6%
Cayman Islands 4.7% 12.9%
France 23.1% 23.8%
Germany 27.9% 21.9%
India 25.1% 18.5%
Japan 38.8% 36.7%
Malaysia 22.8% 18.2%
South Africa 26.7% 22.8%
Sweden 22% 15.4%
Switzerland 20.7% 18.5%
Taiwan 14.4% 18.5%
United Kingdom 23.6% 21.8%
United States 27.7% 25.9%
Non-U.S. average
(unweighted)
22.6% 20%
Non-U.S. average
(weighted)
28.3% 25.2%
Source: Martin A. Sullivan, “Untangling Corporate 
Effective Tax Rates,” Tax Notes, Mar. 16, 2015, p. 1299, 
at p. 1302, Table 3.
69
According to the PwC study, German-domiciled MNCs faced 
average ETRs of 27.9 percent, whereas U.S.-domiciled MNCs faced 
ETRs of 27.7 percent. According to the Markle-Shackelford study, 
German-domiciled MNCs faced average ETRs of 21.9 percent, 
whereas U.S.-domiciled MNCs faced ETRs of 25.9 percent.
70
Markle and Shackelford, “The Impact of Headquarter and 
Subsidiary Locations on Multinationals’ Effective Tax Rate,” NBER 
working paper 19621 (Nov. 2013).
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Our primary finding is that, despite 
decades of international tax planning and 
continuing reports of elaborate innovative 
schemes to avoid taxes, the effective tax 
rates of multinationals vary considerably 
depending on the situs of the company. 
We find dramatic differences in effective 
tax rates based on the headquarters of the 
multinational. Japanese-headquartered 
multinationals face the highest ETRs, by 
far. After controlling for industry and size, 
their ETRs average 8.5 percentage points 
higher than their runner-up counterparts 
from the U.S. The ETRs of American 
multinationals are slightly ahead of those 
from two major trading partners, France 
and Germany. On the other end of the 
distribution, multinationals from the 
Middle East (Tax Havens) enjoy ETRs that 
average 12.5 (10.8) percentage points 
lower than American firms. In short, we 
find that differences continue to persist in 
ETRs between high-tax and low-tax 
countries despite vast investment in 
international tax avoidance.71
Thus, in their 2013 paper, Markle and 
Shackelford reaffirm their earlier conclusion that 
U.S.-domiciled MNCs generally have higher global 
ETRs than the MNCs from other countries with the 
notable exception of Japan. And they emphasize 
that this trend persists through 2011 and in the 
presence of extensive stateless income tax planning.
The above comparisons are more fine-grained 
than simple comparisons of average global ETRs 
for U.S.-domiciled and non-U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs. The two studies described immediately 
above compare the average global ETR of U.S.-
domiciled MNCs with the average global ETR of 
MNCs domiciled in each one of several countries. 
In principle, we would want to dig still deeper 
and to compare global ETRs across rival MNCs 
domiciled in different jurisdictions.72 The average 
U.S. MNC does not compete with the average 
European MNC or even the average German 
MNC. The industry makeup is likely to be 
different across countries, which could bias 
results. Moreover, most companies have 
numerous competitors, not just one major 
competitor,73 and those competitors are often 
based in different states and might have very 
different global ETRs.74 A given U.S.-based MNC 
might not have the lowest or the highest overall 
ETR in the industry. Thus, using global ETRs as a 
measure of how taxation affects competitiveness, 
a U.S.-based company that has neither the highest 
nor the lowest ETR among corporations in its 
industry is more competitive than some 
companies, but less competitive than others. If 
that company inverted and lowered its global 
ETR, it would improve its competitive position 
relative to all of its competitors. It would reduce 
or eliminate the disadvantage relative to those 
MNCs with lower global ETRs, while increasing 
its advantage over MNCs with higher ETRs.
One of the industries that has experienced a 
large number of inversions is healthcare. 
According to a report prepared by PwC, U.S.-
domiciled MNCs have global ETRs that are not 
generally the lowest in the industry. In its 2009 
report, “Pharma 2020: Taxing Times Ahead,” PwC 
calculated five-year average global ETRs for 
leading companies in the pharmaceutical, 
biotechnology, generics, and medical device 
subsectors. That table is reproduced below.
71
Id. at 4.
72
See generally Marian, “Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate 
Tax Discourse in the United States,” 32 Va. Tax Rev. 133 (2012) 
(arguing that cross-border comparisons are often used in debates 
about international taxation without giving sufficient attention to 
why the comparison is being offered or what other differences 
between jurisdictions might be relevant but are not acknowledged).
73
The rivalry between Boeing and Airbus for large commercial 
aircraft is a notable exception.
74
In their 2013 study, Markle and Shackelford find that 
industries are taxed similarly around the world in that high-taxed 
industries, such as transportation, construction, and finance tend to 
be highly taxed regardless of where they are headquartered, and 
low-taxed industries, such as information, manufacturing, and the 
professions, tend to be lightly taxed. Markle and Shackelford, supra 
note 70, at 28, Table 5.
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Table 2. ETRs of Leading Companies in Four Sectors of the 
Pharmaceutical and Life Science Industry
Big Pharma Top 10 Biotech Companies
Company Location
ETR 
(percentage) Company Location
ETR 
(percentage)
Bayer DE 29.30% Cephalon U.S. 39.19%
GlaxoSmithKline UK 29.27% Genentech (pre-merger) U.S. 36.87%
AstraZeneca UK 28.21% Biogen Idec U.S. 31.60%
Wyeth (pre-merger) U.S. 26.26% Genzyme U.S. 30.00%
Roche CH 25.83% Gilead Sciences U.S. 29.20%
Schering-Plough (pre-merger) U.S. 25.80% UCB BE 27.87%
Johnson & Johnson U.S. 25.02% CSL AU 26.38%
Bristol-Myers Squibb U.S. 24.24% Amgen U.S. 24.34%
Merck (pre-merger) U.S. 23.24% Celgene U.S. 24.00%
Pfizer (pre-merger) U.S. 18.21% Actelion CH 12.26%
Sanofi-aventis FR 15.91% Average 28.17%
Novartis CH 14.44%
Average 23.81%
Top 10 Generics Companies Top 10 Medical Device Companies
Company Location
ETR 
(percentage) Company Location
ETR 
(percentage)
Goldshield Group UK 138.52% Cardinal Health U.S. 33.30%
Towa Pharmaceutical JP 42.44% Stryker U.S. 30.50%
Sawai Pharmaceutical JP 39.31% Covidien BM 30.00%
Mylan U.S. 37.80% Boston Scientific U.S. 29.22%
Watson Pharmaceuticals U.S. 35.93% Becton, Dickinson & Co. U.S. 27.57%
Nichi-iko Pharmaceutical JP 33.96% Siemens DE 24.86%
Teva Pharmaceuticals IL 24.69% Medtronic U.S. 24.28%
Pharco Pharmaceuticals EG 12.61% Baxter International U.S. 20.32%
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories IN 5.53% Philips NL 19.06%
EastPharma TR — General Electric U.S. 14.85%
Average 37.08% Average 25.40%
Source: PwC, Pharma 2020: Taxing Times Ahead 7, Figure 5 (2009). East Pharma, established in 2006, had a pre-tax loss in 
each subsequent year before the report was published. ETRs for Siemens, Philips, and GE are those reported in their 
consolidated accounts.
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Table 2 shows substantial variations in tax 
rates across the leading companies in four 
subsectors of the pharmaceutical and life science 
industry. Only in medical devices, does a U.S.-
domiciled MNC, General Electric, have the lowest 
ETR.75 Thus, if we also look at specific market 
sectors, we see that U.S. companies are not always 
those with the lowest ETRs. Note that many 
inverting companies are in the pharmaceutical 
and life science industry, where Swiss 
corporations have a large presence. In the PwC 
and Markle and Shackelford studies, Swiss-based 
MNCs consistently have substantially lower 
global ETRs than do U.S.-based MNCs; also, in the 
PwC study of taxation of the pharmaceutical and 
life science industry, Swiss healthcare companies 
often have lower global ETRs than their U.S. 
competitors.
Moreover, Kleinbard’s claim that U.S. MNCs 
are not at a tax-induced competitive disadvantage 
relative to their foreign rivals and thus cannot 
improve their position by inverting is not well 
supported by the few academic studies that have 
looked at the impact of inverting on inverting 
corporations’ global ETRs. In 2002 Mihir A. Desai 
and James R. Hines Jr. published the first 
empirical study of inversions.76 Their article, 
which covered the 25 or so inversions that had 
been announced through early 2002, examined 
the financial statements of companies announcing 
inversions and the stock market’s reaction to those 
announcements. Desai and Hines found that 
investors in the stock market expect inverting 
companies to reduce their taxes on both foreign- 
and U.S.-source income when they invert.77 They 
further determined that some portion of the 
expected tax benefit from inverting is the 
opportunity to avoid U.S. rules on interest 
expense allocation.78 Thus, they concluded that 
there were both outbound and inbound tax 
savings from inverting.
The next empirical study published on 
inversions was a 2004 article by Jim A. Seida and 
William F. Wempe.79 Using a sample of 12 
inverting companies and 24 matched non-
inverting companies, Seida and Wempe found 
that inverting companies’ global ETRs fell sharply 
after inverting. The global ETR for inverting 
companies fell 11.57 percent after inverting (from 
32.01 to 20.44 percent), whereas the mean ETR for 
the control group fell only 3.98 percent (from 
34.84 to 30.85 percent).80 Seida and Wempe further 
hypothesized that much of the benefit came from 
the inverting companies’ avoidance of U.S. 
taxation on U.S. earnings.81
To identify the source of the tax savings, Seida 
and Wempe closely examined four companies 
that inverted in 2002. They concluded that for two 
of them, the entire reduction in ETRs was a result 
of earnings stripping.82 For the other two 
companies, they estimated that earnings stripping 
was responsible for 84 percent and 38 percent of 
the reduction.83
In a 2010 report, Bret Wells studied three 
companies in the oil field services industry that 
inverted in 2002. He compared the companies’ 
pre-inversion global ETRs for 2000 to 2001 with 
their post-inversion global ETRs for 2003 to 2008. 
He found that each company’s global ETR 
dropped substantially after inverting, with the 
drops ranging from 7 to 16 percent.84
The Desai-Hines, Seida-Wempe, and Wells 
articles all found tax savings from inverting. 
However, those studies all rely exclusively on 
data from inversions that took place before 2004. 
Before 2004, U.S. MNCs could invert through 
what are called “naked inversions.” The U.S. 
company could change residence by merging into 
75
GE, of course, is a large conglomerate with businesses in 
many industries, not just healthcare. According to PwC, GE’s 
global ETR is its ETR across the entire company, not GE’s ETR for 
healthcare.
76
Desai and Hines, “Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the 
Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions,” 55 Nat’l Tax J. 
409 (2002).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Seida and Wempe, “Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings 
Stripping Following Corporate Inversion,” 57 Nat’l Tax J. 805 
(2004).
80
Id. at 820-821, Table 5.
81
Id. at 806-814 (noting a sharp rise in foreign income, but a 
much smaller rise in foreign revenue, and a shift in pretax profit 
margins).
82
Id. at 812-813, Table 2.
83
Id.
84
Wells, supra note 11, at 1352 (NBR’s global ETR dropped 12 
percentage points, from 37 percent to 25 percent; NE’s global ETR 
fell 7 percentage points, from 25 percent to 18 percent; and WFT’s 
global ETR declined 16 percentage points, from 38 percent to 22 
percent).
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a shell corporation registered in another 
jurisdiction. After 2004, the target corporation 
could no longer be a shell; instead, the inversion 
had to involve a substantial target corporation 
with significant assets and business activity. 
Those rules, which have been expanded and 
tightened since 2004, have made it more difficult 
for U.S. MNCs to invert by making it harder to 
find an appropriate target. Also, since 2005, when 
the repatriation holiday ended, successful U.S. 
MNCs have been piling up cash overseas in 
apparent anticipation of a new holiday and as 
they have become more effective in shifting 
income overseas. Thus, one might be reluctant to 
draw conclusions about the current situation from 
studies based on pre-2004 inversions.
It is therefore surprising, in light of the 
attention paid to inversions and the centrality of 
global ETRs to much of that debate, that there are 
so few recent studies on the impact of inversions 
on companies’ global ETRs. In an article 
published in 2016, Doron Narotzki looked at 66 
inversions that occurred between 1982 and 2015. 
He calculated the average global ETRs of 
inverting companies for the five years before they 
inverted and compared them with the average for 
the five years immediately following the 
inversion (or less if the inversion occurred less 
than five years ago). Narotzki found that 
inverting companies on average had ETRs of 20.35 
percent for the five years before inverting. After 
inverting, the average global ETR dropped 14.5 
percent to 5.82 percent.85
Such a large decline in global ETRs suggests 
that the result might be dominated by one or two 
very large corporations. However, Narotzki 
reports that global ETRs fell after inverting, 
regardless of the size of the inverting company. 
Corporations with FMVs below $100 million saw 
their global ETRs drop 1.94 percent; corporations 
between $100 million and $500 million saw their 
global ETRs fall 9.64 percent; corporations 
between $500 million and $1 billion saw their 
ETRs drop the most, 30.11 percent; corporations 
between $1 billion and $5 billion saw an average 
ETR drop of 21.4 percent; corporations between 
$5 billion and $10 billion experienced a drop of 
13.89 percent; and for corporations with FMVs 
above $10 billion, their average ETR dropped 9.49 
percent.86 Thus, Narotzki’s study shows persistent 
drops in global ETRs following inversions.
Narotzki’s study raises several questions, 
however. The fall in global ETRs following 
inversions are surprisingly high, especially the 30.11 
percent drop for companies with market values 
between $500 million and $1 billion. Moreover, 
Narotzki does not describe how he calculates his 
averages or what he does with outlier observations. 
He also does not compare his results to a control 
group of corporations that do not invert. Although 
his partitioning of transactions into different 
tranches based on market value makes it unlikely 
that differences in weighting drove his results, some 
of his results might be driven by unusually high or 
low (possibly negative) tax rates.
In contrast with Narotzki’s conclusions, a 2016 
working paper by Rita Nevada Gunn and Thomas 
Z. Lys finds that inversions increase U.S. tax 
revenue because inverting companies pay no less 
tax after inverting, whereas shareholders pay 
substantially more tax.87 Gunn and Lys use a 
sample of 108 inversions and acquisitions of U.S. 
companies by foreign acquirers between January 
1, 2004, and December 31, 2015.88 Thus, Gunn and 
Lys combine inverting U.S. MNCs with 
acquisitions of U.S. companies by foreign 
acquirers.89 They then compare those companies 
with a control sample of more than 200 foreign 
acquisitions by U.S. corporations in which the 
surviving parent entity remained a U.S. 
domiciliary.90 Gunn and Lys do not report average 
global ETRs for either the inverting companies or 
the control group but instead report average ETRs 
on domestic and foreign income separately for 
both inverting companies and the control group. 
Using data from three years before the inversion 
and three years after (when available), Gunn and 
Lys report an average pre-inversion ETR of 22.3 
85
Narotzki, “The True Economic Effects of Corporate 
Inversions,” Tax Notes, June 27, 2016, p. 1819.
86
Id. at 1828, Table 10.
87
Gunn and Lys, “The Paradoxical Impact of Corporate 
Inversions on US Tax Revenue” (Aug. 21, 2016).
88
Id. at 8.
89
Gunn and Lys lump inverting companies together with 
foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies presumably on the grounds 
that there are likely to be similar tax advantages from having a 
foreign parent.
90
Gunn and Lys, supra note 87, at 8.
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percent on domestic income and 27.5 percent on 
foreign income. They report an average post-
inversion ETR of 19.3 percent on domestic income 
and 39 percent on foreign income.91
Gunn and Lys’s results are concerning for 
several reasons, which are not explained in their 
study. For example, the highest non-U.S. statutory 
corporate tax rate in their sample comes from Japan, 
which is listed as having a 37 percent tax rate,92 yet 
they report that after inverting, companies have an 
average ETR of 39 percent on foreign income. Also, 
Gunn and Lys report that of their 108 inversion 
transactions, U.S. shareholders ended up owning 
less than 50 percent of the combined entity’s 
common stock in 99 of those transactions.93 In 
common parlance, an inversion is a transaction in 
which the U.S. shareholders end up owning more 
than half of the common stock of the combined 
entity. In a foreign acquisition, the shareholders of 
the foreign corporation end up with more than half 
of the common stock. Thus, the Gunn and Lys study 
would not seem to be about inversions, but rather 
about foreign acquisitions.
Two other recent studies do not look explicitly 
and directly at the impact of inverting on 
corporations’ global ETRs but report results that 
are broadly consistent with the idea that inverting 
companies lower their global ETRs. For example, 
a 2015 working paper by Elizabeth Chorvat finds 
that post-2004 inversions have produced 
economically significant excess returns in the 
years following an inversion, although the 
announcement of an inversion does not have an 
immediate effect on stock prices.94 Chorvat also 
finds evidence of a strong correlation between the 
excess returns following an inversion and revenue 
growth attributable to intangibles held in non-
U.S. subsidiaries. However, Chorvat cannot 
determine whether that growth is because of tax 
savings or whether those assets were 
undervalued by the market, so she does not offer 
an explicit conclusion on whether inversions yield 
tax benefits.
In a study published in 2013, Eric J. Allen and 
Susan C. Morse examine recent initial public 
offerings in which the company is listed on an 
exchange based in the United States but 
incorporated outside the United States.95 Allen 
and Morse show that only a small portion of U.S.-
headquartered companies that engage in IPOs are 
incorporated in tax haven countries. They further 
show that the recent increase in the number of 
U.S.-listed companies incorporated in tax havens 
is not attributable to a sharp rise in tax haven 
incorporations by U.S.-headquartered companies 
but rather is a result of a sharp increase in IPOs by 
Chinese-headquartered companies incorporated 
in tax havens.96 Allen and Morse show that U.S.-
headquartered companies account for only a 
small portion of the increase, which is the basis for 
their conclusion that there is not yet a substantial 
exodus of U.S.-headquartered companies away 
from incorporation in the United States. However, 
the authors do find that those U.S.-headquartered 
IPO companies that incorporate in tax havens 
have relatively more foreign income than those 
that incorporate in the United States. They 
interpret that result as suggesting that the 
companies that incorporate in tax havens expect 
to have larger tax benefits than would other 
companies from incorporating in a tax haven.97 
Presumably, if U.S. incorporation was as tax-
efficient as tax haven incorporation, as Kleinbard 
argues, companies with larger foreign earnings 
should be no more likely than other companies to 
incorporate in tax havens.
In summary, the studies using pre-2004 data 
(when naked inversions were possible) 
consistently and uniformly showed substantial 
declines in global ETRs following inversions, with 
the savings likely arising from both U.S. and 
foreign markets. Unfortunately, there are only a 
few recent studies of the effect of inverting on 
corporations’ global ETRs, and the studies that are 
available are neither uniform in their conclusions 
91
Id. at 28-29. Both the decrease in ETR on domestic income and 
the increase on foreign income are significant.
92
Id. at 52, Table 1.
93
Id. at 53, Table 3.
94
Chorvat, “Expectations and Expatriations: A Long-Run Event 
Study,” University of Chicago Public Law working paper no. 445 
(Sept. 20, 2015).
95
Allen and Morse, “Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S.-
Headquartered Firms: No Exodus Yet,” 66 Nat’l Tax J. 396 (2013).
96
Id. at 408-409.
97
Id. at 409-412.
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nor entirely convincing on the impact of inverting 
on a company’s global ETR. Even so, the recent 
studies suggest (and are generally consistent 
with) the notion that many U.S.-domiciled 
companies lower their global ETRs by inverting. 
This would seem to be an area ripe for more work.
Another approach to the question of the 
expected effect of inverting on an MNC’s global 
ETR is to see what the management of an 
inverting company publicly say they expect to 
happen to their firm’s global ETR after inverting. 
Thus, Kleinbard begins his article by giving the 
example of Mylan,98 which inverted by acquiring 
Abbot Laboratories, a Netherlands corporation.99
In 2014 Heather Bresch, the CEO of Mylan,100 
described herself as “reluctantly” inverting but 
having to do so because Mylan’s global tax rate was 
too high relative to its competitors, and Bresch had 
given up hope that Congress would reform the tax 
law to make U.S.-domiciled corporations more 
competitive.101 As Bresch describes it, by inverting, 
Mylan would reduce its global ETR from “about 25 
percent,”102 to around 20 percent in the year 
following the inversion and then into the high teens 
in following years. She offered that reduction in 
Mylan’s expected global ETR as the reason why the 
company was inverting. However, as Kleinbard 
points out, Mylan’s tax rate before inverting was not 
“about 25 percent,” but substantially lower. Mylan’s 
global ETR was 16.2 percent in 2013, 20 percent in 
2012, and 17.7 percent in 2011, according to 
Kleinbard.103 Thus, despite Bresch’s claim that the 
inversion would reduce Mylan’s global ETR, the 
inversion (assuming that the company’s global ETR 
after inverting would be as Bresch predicted) would 
essentially leave Mylan’s global ETR unchanged.
To determine whether the management of 
inverting companies expect to see a decline in 
their global ETRs, I looked at the inversion 
transactions announced since Mylan’s 2015 
inversion to see what management said about 
expected future tax rates. Although not all 
inverting companies publicly stated that they 
expected a decline in their global ETRs, many did. 
For example, Steris Corp., which also inverted in 
2015 and had a global ETR averaging 32.1 percent 
for 2011 through 2013, said it expected its global 
ETR to be about 25 percent in 2016.104 Also, Pfizer, 
whose merger with Allergan was canceled in 2016 
after Treasury issued regulations designed to curb 
inversions, said it expected the inversion to 
reduce its global ETR from roughly 25 percent to 
about 17 to 18 percent.105 Similarly, CF Industries 
Holdings Inc., which canceled its proposed 
merger with Dutch rival OCI after the release of 
the 2016 Treasury regulations curbing inversions, 
had expected to reduce its global ETR from about 
35 percent to roughly 20 percent.106 Also, Applied 
Materials, which in 2015 abandoned its proposed 
merger with Tokyo Electron,107 had said its deal 
would have cut its ETR from 22 to 17 percent.108 
Another company whose management said it 
expected to see its global ETR fall after inverting is 
Johnson Controls, which is merging with Tyco 
(which inverted in 1997). Johnson Control’s 
management said it expected the combined 
company’s global ETR to be 18 or 19 percent. Since 
Tyco paid 12 percent of its income in taxes over 
the last three years, whereas Johnson Controls 
paid 29 percent over that period,109 the expected 
global ETR of 18 or 19 percent would represent a 
10 percent drop for Johnson Controls. Further, 
Waste Connections Inc. said it expects its 
inversion to reduce its global ETR from 40 percent 
98
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1056-1060.
99
Patty Tascarala, “Mylan Inversion Deal Completed,” 
Pittsburgh Business Times, Feb. 27, 2015.
100
More recently, Bresch has been in the news for the sharp 
increase in the price of the EpiPen and Bresch’s compensation 
package.
101
See Sorkin, supra note 14.
102
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1060 n.14.
103
Id. at 1060.
104
Pittsburgh Post Gazette, Feb. 13, 2015, at 2, section C.
105
Chad Bray, “Pfizer to Merge With Allergan in $160 Billion 
Deal,” The New York Times, Nov. 23, 2015; Denise Roland, “Is 
Pfizer’s Deal Good for Ireland?” The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 25, 
2015, at 2, section B.
106
CF Industries Holdings Inc. at Morgan Stanley Global 
Chemicals Conference — Final FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire (Nov. 9, 
2015).
107
Brent Kendall and Don Clark, “Applied Materials, Tokyo 
Electron Cancel Merger Plan; Deal Collapses After Firms Give Up 
on Winning Antitrust Approval,” The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 27, 
2015.
108
Financial Times (London), Sept. 8, 2014, at 17.
109
Bob Tita and Dana Mattioli, “Tyco, Johnson Controls Bet 
Bigger Is Better — Merger Reflects a Growing Push Toward 
Companies That Are Larger, More Focused,” The Wall Street 
Journal, Jan. 26, 2016, at 1, section B. However, Johnson Controls’ 
tax rate before specific items was 19 percent over the prior two 
years.
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to 27 percent.110 Similarly, Baxalta, which is 
merging with Ireland’s Shire, expects the 
combined company to have a global ETR of 16 to 
17 percent, a substantial decline from Baxalta’s 
current rate of 23 to 24 percent. Thus, according to 
public statements, the managers of many 
inverting corporations expect to see their 
companies’ ETRs fall.
However, not all managers of inverting firms 
publicly stated that they expect to see their 
companies’ global ETRs fall after inverting. In at 
least two inversions, management said it expected 
little change in ETR following the transaction. For 
example, IHS, which merged with the U.K.’s 
Markit, reported a global ETR of 20.54 percent for 
2015. According to a statement from IHS, “IHS’s 
tax rate might not change much” after the 
merger.111 Another inversion transaction in which 
management said it did not expect a change in tax 
rates to occur was the 2014 Burger King-Tim 
Hortons merger. However, some observers 
expected Burger King’s global ETR to fall after the 
inversion and believed that there were substantial 
tax benefits from the shift in corporate domicile.112 
In some cases, it can be difficult to tell what 
impact management expects an inversion to have 
on its global ETR because management declines to 
say or because pre-inversion ETRs have been 
volatile. Nonetheless, although not all inverting 
companies report that they expect to see their 
global ETRs fall,113 based on managers’ inversion 
announcements, it would appear that many U.S.-
based MNCs expect to improve their competitive 
position (as measured by their global ETRs) by 
inverting.
In summary, although simple comparisons of 
average global ETRs of U.S.- and non-U.S.-
domiciled MNCs might suggest that U.S. MNCs 
cannot reduce their global ETRs by inverting 
because the average global ETRs of U.S.-
domiciled MNCs are roughly as high as the 
average global ETRs of non-U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs, more extensive and fine-grained data 
suggest the opposite. U.S.-domiciled MNCs have 
higher global ETRs than MNCs domiciled in most 
other market-oriented countries. Also, many U.S.-
domiciled MNCs in the pharmaceuticals industry, 
an industry that has experienced many highly 
publicized inversions, have higher global ETRs 
than their foreign-domiciled rivals. Further, 
studies that looked at pre-2004 inversions, when 
naked inversions were still possible, consistently 
found substantial declines in global ETRs from 
inverting. Although the small number of post-
2004 studies of the impact of inverting on global 
ETRs are not as uniform nor as persuasive as 
earlier studies, taken together those studies 
suggest that many companies see their global 
ETRs fall when they invert. That view is further 
supported by corporate inversion 
announcements, which often indicate that the 
management of inverting U.S. MNCs expect to see 
their global ETRs fall. Thus, viewed through the 
lens of corporations’ global ETRs, Kleinbard’s 
claim that inverting U.S.-domiciled companies do 
not improve their competitive position by 
inverting is not supported by the data and is 
inconsistent with most studies.
2. Market-specific ETRs.
It is easy to understand why commentators 
debating whether the U.S. tax system 
disadvantages U.S.-based MNCs relative to their 
foreign rivals frequently take refuge in global 
ETRs. That approach relies on readily available 
data (public companies report global ETRs in 
their public financial statements) and thus allows   
scholars, analysts, and commentators to compare 
global ETRs across rivals from different 
jurisdictions and look at what happens over time 
to global ETRs. However, that approach buries all 
the hard questions about how U.S. companies and 
their foreign rivals are taxed by subsuming those 
110
Scott Deveau et al., “Texas Trash Hauler Seeks Move to 
Canada in Inversion Deal,” DTR (Jan. 21, 2016).
111
Leslie Picker, “A Merger in Data and Analytics: All-Stock 
Deal Will Create Company With Annual Revenue of $3.3 Billion,” 
International New York Times, Mar. 23, 2016.
112
E.g., John Carney, “Sparing Burger King Some Taxes,” The 
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 27, 2014, at C14; and Zachary R. Mider, 
“Burger King Saying Move Won’t Save Taxes Draws Criticism,” 
Bloomberg Business, Sept. 3, 2014. Interestingly, Tim Hortons 
inverted to Canada in 2009 and gave as one reason the opportunity 
“to take advantage of lower Canadian tax rates.” Id.
113
One might be skeptical of managers’ statements about what 
they expect the effect of an inversion to be on their companies’ 
ETRs. Although there is likely some flexibility (after all, there is a 
long history of earnings management), there is also a risk to the 
managers from dissembling. Managers who knowingly make 
misleading statements can face civil and criminal liability under 
the federal securities law. See generally Amanda Athanasiou, “Eaton 
Corp. Sued Over Statements About Post-Inversion Spinoff,” Tax 
Notes, Aug. 1, 2016, p. 663. There is likely little legal risk from being 
wrong about your prior global ETRs, because those numbers are 
public and available.
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questions under a single, widely available 
number — the global ETR. But the main problem 
with that approach is that it is unclear why 
multinational companies, especially MNCs 
operating in countries with very different tax 
systems and tax rates, should make capital 
budgeting decisions in individual markets using 
global ETRs. Even assuming the managers of 
MNCs focused exclusively on reported 
accounting earnings in making business and 
investment decisions, as Kleinbard sometimes 
argues, it makes no sense for those companies to 
make investment decisions using their global 
ETRs.
Instead, it makes more sense for companies 
whose managers are focused exclusively on 
accounting earnings to make investment 
decisions using whatever accounting tax rates 
their managers expect their companies to incur on 
the earnings generated by those investments. 
Thus, only if a project was expected to produce 
the same geographic distribution of earnings as 
the company’s current projects produce should 
the managers use the company’s global ETR. 
Assuming the earnings from a project were 
expected to have a different distribution than the 
earnings of the company in general, managers of 
an MNC focused exclusively on after-tax earnings 
should use a tax rate that reflected the distribution 
of the expected earnings. In the special case, in 
which the earnings from an investment were 
expected to be taxed in only one jurisdiction, the 
managers should use the company’s ETR from 
that jurisdiction. Hence, Kleinbard’s more 
sophisticated financial accounting argument is 
that U.S.-based MNCs are not at a tax-induced 
competitive advantage relative to foreign rivals 
because their market-specific ETRs are no higher 
than those of their foreign rivals.114
Kleinbard’s argument begins by noting that 
U.S. companies often report global ETRs as low as 
their foreign rivals. That premise then 
immediately leads to the heart of Kleinbard’s 
argument, which is as follows: Because U.S. 
companies typically have a larger share of their 
operations in the United States than do their 
foreign rivals where tax rates are highest, 
presumably — as a simple matter of arithmetic — 
it follows that U.S. companies have lower ETRs on 
foreign-source income than their foreign rivals.115 
As for offering a substantive argument to the 
effect that U.S.-domiciled MNCs have low or 
lower market-specific tax rates than their foreign 
rivals, the above arithmetic argument is it.
Kleinbard also supports his claim that U.S. 
MNCs do not face a financial accounting 
disadvantage relative to their foreign rivals by 
quoting from Leslie Robinson’s 2014 
congressional testimony to the effect that the 
financial accounting literature does not show that 
U.S. MNCs are at a tax disadvantage116:
Leslie Robinson of Dartmouth’s Tuck 
School of Business recently summarized 
the academic and financial accounting 
literature in testimony before the Senate 
Finance Committee as establishing that 
“there is no evidence that U.S. MNCs face 
greater tax burdens as a consequence of 
how foreign profits are taxed, relative to 
their competitors.”117
Starting with Kleinbard’s substantive 
argument, whatever the merits of the arithmetic 
for the general proposition — that U.S. MNCs 
have higher ETRs on average than non-U.S. 
MNCs — such a general argument seems to be a 
flimsy foundation on which to ground a 
114
Robinson is also skeptical of using simple comparisons of 
global ETRs to determine whether MNCs domiciled in one country 
are more competitive than those domiciled in another country. 
According to Robinson, a more reasonable method to make those 
determinations is by comparing ETRs within a single jurisdiction 
operated by MNCs domiciled in different jurisdictions, which we 
have not been able to do. Robinson, supra note 26, at 2-3.
115
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1059. Kleinbard illustrates his 
argument with a hypothetical example of a U.S. MNC and a 
foreign MNC that both pay tax at an overall effective rate of 25 
percent. The U.S. company earns 60 percent of its income from the 
United States, whereas the foreign company earns 40 percent from 
the United States, with both companies effectively taxed at 35 
percent on that income. According to Kleinbard, those assumptions 
imply that the U.S. MNC has an ETR of 10 percent on its non-U.S.-
source income, whereas the foreign company has an ETR of 18.3 
percent. He concludes that the U.S. company “completely 
dominates” the foreign company “along the standard 
‘competitiveness’ yardstick.” Id. at 1059. Of course, the calculated 
ETRs on non-U.S.-source income are derived from simple algebra, 
and the U.S. MNC has a lower ETR on non-U.S.-source income 
because it earns proportionally more income in the United States, 
which is the high-tax jurisdiction, and the companies’ overall ETRs 
are the same. Kleinbard backs up his argument with an example, 
Mylan, which he introduces with the phrase, “This example is not 
entirely fanciful.” Id. at 1059-1060.
116
Robinson, supra note 26, at 2.
117
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1057-1058 (quoting Robinson, 
supra note 26, at 2).
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conclusion that U.S.-based MNCs have as high or 
higher ETRs in specific non-U.S. markets than 
their foreign rivals. Kleinbard also fails to 
establish the premises on which his mathematical 
argument rests. As the last section describes, the 
premise that U.S.-based MNCs have as low or 
lower companywide ETRs than their competitors 
is questionable. The premise that ETRs for both 
U.S. and non-U.S. companies are higher in the 
United States than they are in other jurisdictions 
seems reasonable, as does the premise that U.S. 
MNCs have proportionally larger footprints in 
the United States than do their rivals. However, 
the claim that U.S. MNCs and their foreign rivals 
have similar geographic footprints outside the 
United States is not supported and is highly 
questionable.118
Further, there is other evidence that calls into 
question Kleinbard’s claim that U.S. MNCs have 
jurisdiction-specific ETRs as high as their rivals. 
The tendency for inversions to lower global ETRs 
implies that jurisdiction-specific ETRs are 
lowered somewhat after an inversion. Assuming 
then that MNCs make business and investment 
decisions using jurisdiction-specific ETRs, the 
evidence discussed in the last section showing 
that inversions tend to lower global ETRs 
suggests at the very least that inverting MNCs 
have lower jurisdiction-specific ETRs in some 
jurisdictions, although we do not know which 
ones. A reduction in jurisdiction-specific tax rates 
will improve the competitiveness of inverting 
companies in at least one jurisdiction (assuming 
that companies use market-specific ETRs to make 
investment decisions). Thus, Kleinbard’s indirect 
method of establishing that U.S.-domiciled MNCs 
have as low or lower ETRs than their foreign 
rivals in specific markets comes up short. But that 
is not the same as saying he is wrong.
To establish — or refute — Kleinbard’s claim 
that U.S.-based MNCs have as low or lower ETRs 
in foreign markets than do their non-U.S. rivals 
calls for direct comparisons in specific markets. 
We would like to be able to compare the ETRs in 
specific markets of U.S.-based and non-U.S.-based 
MNCs that compete with one another. 
Unfortunately, however, Kleinbard provides no 
comparisons nor any references to any studies 
comparing overall (global) ETRs of U.S.-based 
and foreign-based MNCs in specific national 
markets.
Although he does not provide evidence or 
refer to any studies, Kleinbard quotes and cites 
Robinson’s testimony that “there is no evidence 
that U.S. MNCs face greater tax burdens as a 
consequence of how foreign profits are taxed, 
relative to their competitors.”119 Kleinbard 
presents Robinson’s testimony as offering an 
affirmative conclusion: U.S. MNCs do not suffer a 
tax-induced disadvantage as compared with their 
foreign rivals. Robinson, however, offers only a 
negative conclusion — that there is insufficient 
evidence in the financial accounting literature to 
establish a conclusion one way or the other. Thus, 
to the quote above, Robinson adds, “Researchers 
cannot make comparisons by jurisdictions that 
would seem necessary to resolve the 
competitiveness issue.”120 Indeed, Robinson 
explicitly rejects Kleinbard’s method of trying to 
derive companies’ market-specific ETRs from 
their global ETRs:
Comparing global ETRs will not detect 
violations of capital import neutrality 
because they, in part, reflect differences in 
location decisions.
Since each MNC has a different geographic 
footprint, a comparison of ETRs within a 
single jurisdiction operated by MNCs 
resident in different countries would seem 
more appropriate. For instance, how does 
the tax burden (including both source and 
host country taxes) on operations in a given 
country compare between U.S. MNCs and 
non-U.S. MNCs? We do not know the 
answer to this question, nor is there good 
data to answer it. At best, we observe the 
source country tax, but do not observe any 
home country tax imposed on profits earned 
in a specific country.121
118
Robinson, supra note 26, at 2-3.
119
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1057-1058 (quoting Robinson, 
supra note 26, at 2).
120
Robinson, supra note 26, at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
121
Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
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As Robinson makes clear, we simply do not 
know what MNCs’ ETRs are in specific markets, 
much less how they differ based on where the 
company is based. I am unaware of any such 
studies, and Robinson flatly says that as of 
summer 2014, there were none available.122 
Without any studies to rely on, any conclusion is 
shaky. The claim that U.S.-domiciled MNCs have 
jurisdiction-specific ETRs as high as their 
competitors is merely conjecture.123 Thus, on the 
more sophisticated version of Kleinbard’s 
financial accounting claim, we currently lack the 
data to make an informed judgment whether 
inversions lower market-specific ETRs in 
specified identified markets.
B. The Cash Flow Claim
Kleinbard not only argues that U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs are not at a tax-induced competitive 
disadvantage relative to their foreign rivals based 
on financial accounting conceptions of tax 
burdens, he further argues that U.S. MNCs are not 
at a disadvantage based on cash flow taxes. I now 
examine that claim.
Modern finance theory teaches that business 
and investment (sometimes called capital 
budgeting) decisions should be made on the basis 
of net present value (NPV) using after-tax cash 
flows, not financial accounting concepts. The 
NPV rule is to accept all investments with a 
positive NPV and to reject all investments with a 
negative NPV. The NPV of a project is the 
discounted value of the expected future net after-
tax cash flows from that project. The discount rate 
is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for 
the project, which can differ from that of the 
company. The WACC is the before-tax cost of the 
incremental equity and the after-tax cost of the 
incremental debt that supports the project. Thus, 
the tax rate appears in both the numerator and the 
denominator. According to modern finance 
theory, the relevant tax rate is the marginal cash 
tax rate (often referred to simply as the MTR). 
That tax rate is neither an average tax rate nor a 
financial accounting concept. Instead, the MTR of 
a project is the present value of the incremental 
taxes to be paid if the project is undertaken, 
divided by the present value of the project’s net 
cash flow. That tax rate reflects both when that 
cash flow is taxed and the rate at which it is taxed.
Once again, Kleinbard’s claim that 
competitiveness arguments are baseless is a claim 
that U.S.-domiciled MNCs incur no costs because of 
the United States’ worldwide tax system with 
deferral. That no-cost claim implies that U.S. 
companies pay no U.S. tax on their overseas 
earnings and incur no costs from deferring or 
avoiding U.S. taxation. Thus, the no-cost claim 
implies the following: (1) U.S. companies pay no 
explicit tax costs from repatriating cash to the 
United States; (2) U.S. companies pay no explicit tax 
costs from keeping cash abroad; (3) U.S. companies 
incur no explicit nontax costs from holding cash 
abroad; and (4) U.S. companies incur no implicit 
nontax costs from holding cash overseas.124
In contrast with Kleinbard’s claim, there is 
good reason to believe that unconstrained U.S.-
domiciled MNCs (that is, companies that do not 
need to repatriate overseas cash to fund U.S. 
investment) incur all four types of costs. First, 
some unconstrained companies do incur the 
122
Id. at 2-3.
123
In July 2016 two researchers from Vienna University of 
Economics and Business, Saskia Kohlhase and Jochen Pierk, posted 
a paper on SSRN, the title of which suggests that they answered 
whether foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs pay higher or lower 
taxes than their non-U.S. rivals in specific markets. Kohlhase and 
Pierk, “Why Are U.S.-Owned Foreign Subsidiaries Not Tax 
Aggressive?” WU International Taxation research paper series no. 
2016-03 (July 2016). The authors consistently find that subsidiaries 
of U.S. MNCs have higher national ETRs than do subsidiaries of 
MNCs from countries with territorial tax systems in various 
European countries. However, because Kohlhase and Pierk use 
unconsolidated financial statements of European subsidiaries 
owned by foreign MNCs for 2005 through 2009, a period the 
authors say during which Germany had a close alignment between 
book and tax income, the authors’ research design allows them to 
identify tax planning that reduces taxes but does not reduce 
income, such as locating production facilities in subnational states 
with low taxes. Unfortunately, their design does not allow them to 
identify income shifting through related-party debt, royalties, and 
aggressive transfer pricing, because that shifting reduces both taxes 
and income. Of course, it is such income shifting, which Kleinbard 
has labeled “stateless income,” that is at the heart of the debate 
over MNCs’ ETRs in specific markets.
124
As Kleinbard recognizes, U.S.-domiciled companies that are 
capital constrained and thus need to repatriate foreign earnings to 
undertake profitable U.S. investments are taxed at full statutory 
rates on their overseas income. Those companies are at a tax 
disadvantage relative to their foreign rivals by virtue of the U.S. 
worldwide tax system, even though that system provides for the 
possibility of deferral. Those companies cannot defer repatriation 
indefinitely because they need access to their overseas cash to 
make domestic investments, so the U.S. worldwide tax puts them 
at a competitive disadvantage. Although there are circumstances in 
which it might be difficult to determine whether a company is 
capital constrained, Kleinbard focuses on companies that are not 
capital constrained and thus do not need to repatriate foreign 
earnings in order to make profitable U.S. investments.
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explicit tax cost of repatriation at the statutory 
rate. Despite the potentially large U.S. tax bite, 
some companies repatriate earnings, which 
exposes them to the potential 35 percent U.S. 
corporate tax rate. Unconstrained major 
corporations with large cash holdings that have 
repatriated earnings in recent years include eBay 
and GE.125 If it were costless to hold untaxed 
earnings overseas, companies that were not 
capital constrained would presumably never 
repatriate and never pay U.S. tax on their offshore 
earnings.
Further, the 2004-2005 tax holiday that 
reduced the maximum repatriation tax rate from 
35 percent to 5.25 percent saw 843 U.S. MNCs 
repatriate in aggregate $362 billion (of which $312 
billion was subject to the reduced holiday tax 
rate).126 Such large and widespread repatriations 
are inconsistent with the notion that it is costless 
for U.S. MNCs to maintain foreign cash balances 
that would be subject to taxation upon 
repatriation. If it were costless for companies to 
keep repatriated earnings overseas, presumably 
they would have forgone repatriation during the 
holiday.127
Second, there is an explicit U.S. tax cost from 
holding cash balances in non-U.S. subsidiaries. 
The interest on those cash balances is subject to 
current U.S. taxation whether it is repatriated or 
held abroad in accordance with the current U.S. 
antiabuse regime.128 Thus, on their foreign cash 
balances, U.S. MNCs earn only the after-
corporate-tax rate of return, not the before-
corporate-tax rate of return. In contrast, if the 
income were repatriated and distributed to 
shareholders (without corporate tax), the 
shareholders could invest the cash without being 
subject to further corporate taxation. The 
corporate tax paid on U.S. MNCs’ overseas 
interest earnings is an explicit tax cost from 
holding cash overseas.129
In recent years, some U.S.-domiciled MNCs 
with large overseas cash balances have borrowed 
large sums of money and used those proceeds to 
pay dividends, repurchase shares, or invest in 
domestic operations. The best-known example is 
Apple, which has borrowed roughly $75 billion.130 
Because Apple can deduct its interest payments 
from its income, the interest the company pays on 
its $75 billion in debt roughly offsets the interest it 
earns on $75 billion of its overseas cash holdings. 
Apple’s offset, however, is incomplete.
Congress long ago recognized that the U.S. tax 
law encourages U.S.-domiciled MNCs to borrow 
in the United States rather than abroad in order to 
reduce their U.S. taxable income without 
reducing their overall global income. 
Accordingly, U.S.-domiciled companies are 
required to apportion their borrowings between 
U.S. and foreign income.131 As a result, not all 
interest paid on Apple’s $75 billion of debt is 
deductible in the United States. Some of that 
interest is apportioned to foreign income and will 
generate a tax benefit only when foreign earnings 
are repatriated.
125
Greg Bensinger, “EBay to Take $3 Billion Tax Charge,” The 
Wall Street Journal, Apr. 29, 2014 (eBay announced that it was 
repatriating $9 billion, most of its overseas cash, at an expected tax 
cost of $3 billion); Vipal Monga, “GE Jumps on the Repatriation 
Bandwagon,” The Wall Street Journal, Apr 10, 2015 (GE announced 
that it will repatriate $36 billion of $61 billion held overseas and 
pay $6 billion in taxes; the funds are to be used to help pay for 
dividends, share repurchases, and a share exchange from spinning 
off its private-label credit card business).
126
Melissa Redmiles, “One-Time Received Dividend 
Deduction,” 27 SOI Bull. 103 (2008).
127
The economic literature on the repatriation holiday focuses 
on how the repatriated funds were used. See, e.g., Thomas J. 
Brennan, “Where the Money Went: A New Understanding of the 
ACJA Tax Holiday,” working paper (Mar. 6, 2014); Brennan, “What 
Happens After a Holiday? Long-Term Effects of the Repatriation 
Provision of the AJCA,” 5 Nw. JL. & Soc. Pol’y 1 (2010); Jennifer L 
Blouin and Linda K. Krull, “Bringing It Home: A Study of the 
Incentives Surrounding the Repatriation of Foreign Earnings 
Under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,” 47 J. Acct Res. 1027 
(2009); and Dhammika Dhamapala, C. Fritz Foley, and Kristin J. 
Forbes, “Watch What I Do, Not What I Say: The Unintended 
Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act,” 66 J. Fin. 753 
(2011).
128
Sections 951(a), 952(a)(2), and 954(c)(1)(A).
129
The tax cost of earning interest on cash held offshore varies 
directly with interest rates.
130
Apple’s balance sheet as of September 24, 2016, available on 
Yahoo Finance (long-term debt of $75 billion); Tim Higgins, “Tim 
Cook’s $181b Headache,” Bloomberg, July 22, 2015.
131
Section 864(e).
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Moreover, Apple’s offset is incomplete 
because the company holds more cash overseas 
than it has debt outstanding. Apple holds $180 
billion in overseas cash, not $75 billion.132 The 
company thus holds $105 billion in cash in its 
foreign subsidiaries, against which it has not 
borrowed. Accordingly, Apple is paying tax on 
the interest generated by its $105 billion of 
overseas cash not offset by domestic borrowings, 
so the company incurs an explicit tax cost from 
holding that cash. That, in turn, presumably 
means that the cash Apple holds abroad is less 
valuable to the company (as a U.S.-domiciled 
corporation) than it would be to a foreign-
domiciled corporation, which could repatriate 
and distribute the proceeds to shareholders 
without incurring home-country tax.
Also, although Apple’s $75 billion of 
borrowing is typically referred to as “arbitrage,” it 
is an imperfect form of arbitrage. That is because 
the offsetting transactions are incomplete and 
risky. Traditional arbitrage transactions provide a 
profit without risk and can be unwound without 
cost (other than transaction costs). Unlike 
traditional arbitrage, Apple’s arbitrage is 
incomplete because the company cannot deduct 
all of the interest it pays on its debt. Moreover, 
because Apple cannot unwind the transaction 
costlessly, its arbitrage is risky. If at some point 
Apple decides it wants to close out the arbitrage, 
it must pay off its offsetting U.S. debt. However, 
Apple cannot pay off its U.S. debt using its 
overseas funds without also paying tax upon 
repatriation.133 The risk inherent in the arbitrage is 
underscored by Apple borrowing against only 
two-fifths of its offshore cash.
Third, there are explicit nontax costs from 
holding cash overseas. There is a widespread 
view that overseas cash holdings that would be 
subject to tax upon repatriation are valued by the 
market at less than their face value.134 And 
companies that borrow to access that cash, 
because the arbitrage is imperfect, find their credit 
rating downgraded and hence their interest 
expense increased.135
Fourth, there is also evidence that U.S.-
domiciled MNCs that hold large amounts of 
offshore earnings incur implicit nontax costs to 
avoid paying tax upon repatriation, including tax 
planning and structuring costs.136 Harry Grubert 
and Rosanne Altshuler estimated the implicit 
costs of accumulating deferrals using data from 
the 2004-2005 repatriation tax holiday.137 They 
concluded that “the marginal cost of deferral is 
very low immediately after the tax holiday 
repatriations, but after 10 years, that is, by 2015, it 
rises to about 7 percentage points.”138 Grubert and 
Altshuler further concluded that the implicit costs 
of deferring repatriations increase with the size of 
the cash balances.139
Another indication of the cost to companies of 
holding cash overseas is the effort and expense 
U.S.-based MNCs undertake in order to invert. 
Any sizeable merger and acquisition is expensive, 
but inversions are especially expensive. Price 
premiums — the excess of the merger price over 
the market price of the target before the 
transaction is announced — are often higher for 
inversion transactions than for other 
transactions.140 Also, inverting companies are 
frequently downgraded by the credit reporting 
agencies, which results in higher borrowing costs, 
further increasing the cost of inverting.141
The discussion above looks only at the current 
costs of holding cash overseas. Although it can be 
difficult to make reliable estimates, capital 
budgeting is a forward-looking exercise. The NPV 
rule does not use current cash flows, but rather 
132
Higgins, supra note 130.
133
Apple could, of course, use U.S. funds to pay off the debt 
without incurring repatriation taxes, but that assumes Apple has 
excess U.S. funds. That is uncertain, whereas the excess foreign 
funds are present.
134
Foley et al., “Why Do Firms Hold So Much Cash? A Tax-
Based Explanation,” 86 J. Fin. Econ. 579 (2007); Hanlon et al., “The 
Effect of Repatriation Tax Costs on U.S. Multinationals,” 116 J. Fin. 
Econ. 179 (2015).
135
Robinson, supra note 26. See also Standard and Poor’s Rating 
Services, “Ratings Direct Draft: Inversions Lower Tax Liabilities, 
But Also Can Impair Credit Ratings,” Sept. 8, 2014 (noting that 
inverted companies are frequently downgraded because of their 
increased use of debt).
136
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1057.
137
Grubert and Altshuler, “Fixing the System: An Analysis of 
Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax,” 66 Nat’l 
Tax J. 671 (2013).
138
Id. at 685.
139
Id. at 683.
140
Athananasiou, “Inversion Premiums Deconstructed,” Tax 
Notes, Sept. 8, 2014, p. 116.
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S&P, supra note 135.
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expected future cash flows. And there are good 
reasons to believe for U.S.-domiciled MNCs, the 
explicit and implicit costs of earning overseas 
income and holding cash abroad will increase — 
or at least that the managers of those companies 
might conclude that there is a nontrivial 
possibility of such an increase.
For example, in addition to the steps Treasury 
has taken to curb inversions, the Obama 
administration proposed a 19 percent minimum tax 
on U.S.-domiciled MNCs’ overseas income without 
deferral, and Jacob Lew, Obama’s Treasury 
secretary, claimed in late 2016 that there was 
bipartisan support in Congress for such a tax.142 
Further, President Trump as well as his Democratic 
opponent in the general election, Hillary Clinton, 
have both endorsed a minimum tax on U.S. MNCs’ 
foreign income.143 A minimum tax would raise taxes 
on overseas income of U.S.-domiciled MNCs, 
thereby weakening the competitiveness of U.S. 
MNCs relative to their foreign rivals.144
Moreover, managers of U.S.-domiciled MNCs 
might reasonably believe that it will become even 
more difficult for U.S. MNCs to invert and escape 
worldwide taxation. During the presidential 
campaign, Clinton released a detailed proposal 
designed to stop inversions.145 Her proposal called 
for raising to 50 percent the foreign ownership 
threshold for a merger to change the legal 
domicile of the parent corporation. Clinton also 
proposed an exit tax on the untaxed overseas 
profits of U.S. companies acquired by foreign 
corporations.146 Without being specific, Trump 
repeatedly said during the campaign that he 
would stop inversions.147
The significance of all this for Kleinbard’s cash 
flow claim is that a U.S. MNC looking at the current 
tax situation and anticipating what is likely to 
happen should have no problem finding a 
competitiveness rationale rooted in U.S. taxation for 
inverting. Even if the company’s managers agreed 
with Kleinbard that their company is not currently 
disadvantaged relative to its non-U.S. rivals given 
the current tax laws, they might still reasonably 
conclude that there is a plausible chance that future 
tax reforms (such as the elimination of deferral) 
would make them worse off than their non-U.S. 
competitors. Also, calls to tighten the anti-inversion 
rules even more — such as by requiring that the 
foreign merger partner be larger than the U.S. 
partner in order for the transaction to be respected 
as shifting domicile — are further encouraging U.S. 
companies to invert.148
The above analysis looks to the future. If we 
step back several years and look forward with the 
benefit of hindsight, we see a similar pattern. In 
recent years, the United States has enacted 
policies designed to raise the tax on income held 
offshore (such as the anti-hopscotch rules in the 
April 2016 notice) and other policies that make it 
more difficult for companies to invert (through a 
series of changes adopted beginning in 2004). 
Most recently, Treasury finalized regulations 
under section 385 that target inverting companies 
but make it more difficult for all companies to 
strip earnings out from the United States by 
142
Stephanie Soong Johnston, “Lew Says EU State Aid Issue 
Could Lead to ‘Perfect Storm’ for Tax Reform” (Oct. 7, 2016).
143
Trump tax reform (deemed repatriation of corporate profits 
at a one-time tax rate of 10 percent); David Dayen, “The Huge 
Corporate Tax Cut Hillary Clinton Doesn’t Talk About,” New 
Republic, Oct. 21, 2016 (in the first presidential debate, Clinton 
followed Trump’s endorsement of a 10 percent tax on foreign 
earnings, saying “I happen to support that in a way that will 
actually work to our benefit.”).
144
There is an uncomfortable tension between Kleinbard’s 
support (on one hand) of proposals that would end deferral and 
make it more difficult for U.S. MNCs to escape from the U.S. 
worldwide tax system (e.g., Americans for Tax Fairness, supra note 
23, at 3) and his insistence (on the other hand) that U.S. MNCs are 
not at a competitive disadvantage because they are taxed no more 
heavily than their non-U.S. rivals. The tension arises because even 
if Kleinbard is correct that at the current time and on a cash basis, 
U.S. MNCs face taxes no higher than those faced by their foreign 
rivals, capital budgeting is a forward-looking exercise in which 
taxpayers make investment decisions today by estimating expected 
future cash flows, including expected future taxes. Thus, even if the 
current “ersatz territorial tax system” is effectively equivalent to (or 
even less burdensome than) actual territorial systems, a shift in the 
U.S. tax system toward a system that more closely resembles a 
traditional worldwide tax system (such as taxing overseas income 
at a minimum rate without deferral) would reduce returns on 
investments made by U.S. MNCs, thereby hampering their 
competitiveness. For example, if the United States were to tax the 
foreign income of U.S. MNCs without deferral at the statutory rate, 
U.S. MNCs would clearly be disadvantaged relative to their non-
U.S. rivals, and thus there would be a clear forward-looking benefit 
to inverting: Inverting companies would escape the taxes the 
United States would impose on U.S.-domiciled MNCs’ overseas 
income.
145
Clinton Factsheets: “Ending Inversions and Investing in 
America.” See Mindy Herzfeld, “Clinton’s Exit Tax and a Broader 
Business Tax Reform Agenda,” Tax Notes, Aug. 29, 2016, p. 1195.
146
Thus, Clinton’s proposal would seem to call for imposing an 
exit tax on the unrepatriated earnings of U.S. MNCs that are 
acquired by foreign companies. Herzfeld, supra note 145, at 1196.
147
Jared Meyer, “More Economic Nonsense From Trump,” 
National Review, Feb. 15, 2016.
148
Clinton Factsheets, supra note 145; Herzfeld, supra note 145.
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issuing new debt. The regulations thus give 
existing internal debt-intensive capital structures 
a big advantage over new structures. Companies 
that completed their inversions before April 2016, 
the relevant date under the regulations, have a 
significant edge over companies that would invert 
after that date.
Thus, whether using hindsight to look from 
the past to today, or looking forward from today 
into an uncertain future, there are strong, 
competitiveness-rooted reasons for U.S. 
companies to invert. Strong reasons, however, are 
not the same as certainty. The surprise election of 
Trump, whose embrace of mercantilist language 
calls into question long-standing policies and 
practices, underscores the difficulty in making 
definitive statements about whether U.S.-
domiciled MNCs can expect to raise or lower their 
MTRs by inverting. That uncertainty, however, 
does not support Kleinbard’s claim that 
competitiveness has nothing to do with 
inversions. Uncertainty can be a reason to invert 
rather than delay doing so. An inverted company 
can presumably reverse its decision and 
reestablish U.S. domicile; however, a company 
that has not inverted might find inverting more 
difficult in the future.
Further, when we avoid trying to predict how 
tax (and other policies) will evolve in the future 
(which is part of a complete discounted cash flow 
analysis) and just focus on the simpler and 
narrower questions at the heart of Kleinbard’s 
cash flow claim — that the U.S. worldwide tax 
system imposes on U.S.-domiciled MNCs no costs 
of earning foreign income — we see that for the 
reasons given above, a U.S. MNC’s expected 
marginal tax cost of earning income overseas will 
very likely be positive, although the magnitude of 
that cost is uncertain. The alternative hypothesis, 
that the cost is zero, seems unlikely in light of the 
above and has certainly not been established. Yet 
that is the position Kleinbard not only endorses 
but claims is supported by the evidence. 
Although the above arguments are detrimental to 
Kleinbard’s claim that the U.S. tax system is an 
“ersatz territorial” tax system (that is, that there is 
no tax cost on overseas earnings), they are not 
dispositive of the broader claim that U.S. MNCs 
are at a tax disadvantage relative to their foreign 
rivals, because Kleinbard still has one possible 
escape hatch.
As Kleinbard argues, non-U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs can face a higher tax burden than do U.S.-
domiciled MNCs on income earned outside the 
parent corporation’s state of domicile. The idea is 
that non-U.S.-domiciled MNCs are subject to 
stricter antiabuse rules in their home country 
(despite being domiciled in nominally territorial 
states) on foreign-source income (and on 
domestic income shifted abroad) than are U.S.-
domiciled MNCs (domiciled in an ostensibly 
worldwide state), so the non-U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs actually face higher taxes than U.S.-
domiciled MNCs.
Antiabuse rules typically apply to 
corporations domiciled in a state, and they tax at 
the corporation’s marginal rate the income of 
CFCs that is shifted or seen as problematic. Thus, 
although the United States has one of the highest 
statutory corporate tax rates among OECD 
countries, Kleinbard suggests that U.S. antiabuse 
rules are more porous and capture sufficiently 
less income than those of other countries, 
rendering the U.S. antiabuse rules less 
burdensome.149
Kleinbard makes that argument several times 
in his 2014 article, beginning on the second page, 
where he describes the environment in which U.S. 
MNCs operate as an “ersatz territorial 
environment, without any of the anti-abuse rules 
that a thoughtful territorial tax system would 
impose” (emphasis added).150 And in the next 
paragraph, he argues that it is relatively easy for 
U.S. companies to aggressively move income 
from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions because 
they are “unencumbered by any of the anti-abuse 
rules to which non-U.S. multinationals domiciled 
in jurisdictions with better designed territorial 
systems might be subject” (emphasis added).151 
The tentative language is revealing. Not only are 
the statements not supported by data or 
149
A similar sentiment is expressed in the letter signed by 24 tax 
experts. Americans for Tax Fairness, supra note 23, at 2 (“U.S. 
multinationals are unquestionably the world’s leaders in global tax-
avoidance strategies.”).
150
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1056.
151
Id.
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examples, their very language underscores the 
lack of evidence for Kleinbard’s claim that non-
U.S.-domiciled MNCs are subject to more 
stringent antiabuse rules.
And later in his article, Kleinbard responds 
directly to the argument that non-U.S. MNCs are 
better able to shift income around than U.S.-
domiciled MNCs. His response is that the claim 
“is not easily demonstrated, and it ignores anti-
base erosion developments like the OECD’s [base 
erosion and profit-shifting] project or the EU’s 
common consolidated corporate tax base.”152 To 
support his claim that competitiveness has 
nothing to do with inversions, Kleinbard has the 
burden of showing either that U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs are not taxed on foreign earnings 
(including U.S. earnings shifted abroad) or that 
non-U.S.-domiciled companies are subject to 
stricter antiabuse rules. His statement here does 
neither; it only asserts that the opposite view 
cannot be readily shown. As for the other 
developments, these reasons seem tenuous. The 
BEPS project, which is under the auspices of the 
OECD, applies to the United States as well as to 
the EU. And the OECD produced its final BEPS 
reports only in October 2015 — reports that have 
yet to be implemented. Also, the EU’s common 
corporate tax base project has not yet produced an 
agreement, let alone been implemented.153
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that 
EU corporations are not tightly constrained by 
antiabuse regimes. In 2006 the Court of Justice of 
the European Union issued a decision that 
severely restricts the ability of EU member states 
to enact CFC rules that might otherwise restrain 
widespread shifting of income to low-tax 
jurisdictions within the EU. In its Cadbury-
Schweppes decision,154 the CJEU held that the 
United Kingdom’s CFC rules violated freedom of 
establishment rights under the EU treaties 
because those rules were not limited “to wholly 
artificial arrangements.” In 2010, in light of the 
CJEU’s Cadbury decision, the European Council 
recommended that member states include an 
exception clause in their antiabuse regimes 
restricting their reach within the EU to only 
wholly artificial arrangements. Most EU member 
states have complied, substantially weakening 
antiabuse rules within the EU regarding income 
that is taxed in a member state. With low 
corporate tax rates in Luxembourg and Ireland, 
EU-domiciled MNCs have significant 
opportunities to reduce taxes by shifting income 
without running afoul of antiabuse rules.155
Ultimately, however, to answer whether U.S. 
MNCs or their foreign rivals are subject to stricter 
antiabuse regimes requires evidence. 
Unfortunately, quantitative evidence of the 
amount by which CFC legislation raises the cost 
of earning foreign profits for U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs and for non-U.S.-domiciled MNCs is 
lacking. However, in a 2012 working paper, 
Robinson and Markle develop an index of the 
152
Id. at 1067. Note the shift from arguing that the U.S. tax 
system does not disadvantage U.S. MNCs to arguing that the 
converse claim — that U.S. MNCs are at a tax disadvantage — has 
not been established.
153
The lack of evidence to support the claim that U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs are able to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions more easily 
and at lower cost than non-U.S.-domiciled MNCs is further 
underscored by Robinson’s testimony, when she describes the 
relative costs of complying with antiabuse regimes as follows:
It is entirely possible that, for a given profit generated in a 
low-tax country, a non-U.S. MNC faces a higher tax burden
due to “strong” anti-abuse rules taxing those source country
profits in the MNC’s home country, while the U.S. firm faces
indefinite deferral of home country tax under “weak” 
anti-abuse rules.
Robinson, supra note 26, at 2 n.5. And although Robinson 
acknowledges that is costly for U.S. companies to keep cash 
abroad, she describes the assumption that those costs are 
lower for non-U.S. MNCs than for U.S. MNCs as “not clear.” 
Id. at 5 (“There is evidence supporting the notion that U.S. 
MNCs face non-trivial implicit costs of deferral that may put 
them at a competitive disadvantage, but there is no 
comparison of these costs to MNCs based in other countries. 
Competing firms operating under territorial tax systems may 
also bear implicit costs of avoiding home country tax through 
the need to navigate anti-abuse rules in the home country. The 
implicit cost is assumed to be low for non-U.S. MNCs, relative 
to U.S. MNCs. However, the validity of this assumption is not 
clear” (emphasis removed).).
154
Cadbury-Schweppes, C-196/04 (Sept. 12, 2006).
155
Two recent studies by German researchers examining the 
impact of the 2006 Cadbury-Schweppes decision and its aftermath on 
income shifting by EU-domiciled MNCs conclude that the EU’s 
antiabuse rules are not very strict. Martin Ruf and Alfons 
Weichenrieder examined the impact of the Cadbury-Schweppes 
decision on the location of passive investments. They conclude that 
the decision has led to substantial shifting of passive investments 
within the EU, especially to low-taxed Ireland. They also find that 
much of that shifting replaced shifting to tax havens outside 
Europe. Ruf and Weichenrieder, “CFC Legislation, Passive Assets 
and the Impact of the ECJ’s Cadbury-Schweppes Decision,” WU 
International Taxation research paper no. 2014-02. Another group, 
Rainer Brautigam, Christoph Stengel, and Frank Streif, examined 
the effect of the CJEU’s Cadbury-Schweppes decision on capital 
import and capital export neutrality. They find that the decision led 
to substantial declines in effective tax rates, which suggests 
widespread income shifting. Brautigam, Spengel, and Streif, 
“Decline of CFC Rules and Rise of IP Boxes: How the ECJ Affects 
Tax Competition and Economic Distortions in Europe,” ZEW 
discussion paper no. 15-055 (2015).
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strength of countries’ CFC legislation. Their index 
is comparative, even if it does not translate 
directly into measurable costs. Robinson and 
Markle examined the cross-border tax systems of 
28 countries. They classify 10 of them — including 
Austria, Belgium, India, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Russia, and Switzerland — as not having CFC 
regimes.156 Among the 18 countries in the sample 
with CFC regimes, they find that the United States 
is in the middle of the pack.157 That is hardly 
strong evidence that U.S. MNCs are subject to 
laxer antiabuse rules than their rivals, and it is no 
support for the notion that stricter antiabuse 
regimes offset the positive direct and indirect tax 
costs U.S. companies incur on foreign earnings — 
costs that seem likely even if they cannot be 
readily quantified.
A recently published article by Markle further 
questions the notion that non-U.S.-based MNCs are 
subject to stricter antiabuse regimes than U.S.-based 
MNCs.158 He looks at whether income shifting 
occurs more frequently when parent corporations 
are domiciled in jurisdictions with territorial or 
worldwide tax systems. His main result, which is 
based on data from 2004 to 2008, is that income 
shifting is more prevalent among corporations 
domiciled in territorial states than among 
corporations domiciled in worldwide states.159 
Markle further decomposes his results into income 
shifted among foreign subsidiaries and income 
shifted from a domestic corporation (either the 
parent or a subsidiary) to a foreign subsidiary. He 
concludes that shifting income among foreign 
subsidiaries is as common, regardless of where the 
parent is located.160 However, shifting income out 
from the state of domicile is more common when the 
parent is domiciled in a territorial jurisdiction.161 
Thus, Markle’s study, which at best (from the 
perspective of Kleinbard’s claim that inversions do 
not improve competitiveness) can be read to 
conclude that there is no more income shifting with 
worldwide parents than with territorial parents, 
does not suggest that U.S. antiabuse laws are laxer 
than those of other states and can therefore make up 
for the higher tax and nontax costs from a 
worldwide tax system. Thus, although foreign 
antiabuse regimes might be sufficiently stricter than 
those to which U.S. companies are subject so as to 
offset the direct and indirect costs of the U.S. 
deferred worldwide tax system, there is still no 
evidence to support the conclusion that in practice 
the antiabuse rules of any specific jurisdiction are 
sufficiently stricter to offset the direct and indirect 
costs incurred by U.S.-domiciled MNCs.
In summary, there is little evidence whether 
the cost to U.S.-domiciled MNCs of worldwide 
taxation with deferral plus the U.S. antiabuse 
rules is greater than the cost to non-U.S. MNCs 
domiciled in territorial states of complying with 
their home states’ antiabuse regimes. We simply 
lack the studies that would allow us to compare 
the costs of being subject to different antiabuse 
regimes based on the state of domicile. We 
therefore cannot say confidently that non-U.S. 
companies’ costs of dealing with antiabuse rules 
are higher than those of their foreign rivals. 
However, Kleinbard does not argue that we are 
unsure whether the U.S. tax system 
disadvantages U.S.-domiciled companies relative 
to their foreign rivals on a cash flow basis, but 
rather argues that the U.S. tax system does not so 
disadvantage U.S.-domiciled MNCs. Given the 
strong evidence that U.S. companies incur costs 
from deferral, and the lack of evidence that those 
costs are offset by the costs of non-U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs complying with their home-country CFC 
regimes, Kleinbard’s strong claim that 
competitiveness arguments for inversions are 
baseless is itself only conjecture and is 
inconsistent with the weight of evidence, which 
shows that for U.S.-domiciled MNCs, there are 
nontrivial costs of holding large amounts of 
untaxed cash offshore in foreign subsidiaries.
C. The Emerson ‘Competitiveness Fable’
Kleinbard seeks to support his argument that 
U.S.-domiciled MNCs are not at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to non-U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs on either a financial accounting or cash flow 
156
Markle and Robinson, “Tax Haven Use Across International 
Tax Regimes,” at 37, Table 2 (Nov. 2012).
157
Id.; Robinson, supra note 26, at 6 (“the U.S. ranks right in the 
middle, in terms of the strength of its CFC legislation, among the 
198 countries in the sample with CFC legislation”).
158
Markle, “A Comparison of the Tax-Motivated Income 
Shifting of Multinationals in Territorial and Worldwide Countries,” 
33 Contemp. Acct Res. 7 (2016).
159
Id. at 9.
160
Id.
161
Id.
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basis by debunking a “competitiveness fable” 
corporate managers tell about how the U.S. tax 
system disadvantages U.S. MNCs in their 
competition with foreign rivals. In 2006 Emerson 
Electric, a U.S. corporation, sought to acquire 
another U.S.-domiciled corporation, American 
Power Conversion (APC), which had more than 
half its earnings outside the United States. 
Emerson was outbid by Schneider Electric, a 
French corporation, which ultimately acquired 
APC for $6 billion, a 30 percent premium over 
APC’s stock price and $1 billion (20 percent) more 
than Emerson’s highest offer. According to 
Emerson’s CFO at the time, Walter Galvin, 
Schneider was able to outbid Emerson for APC 
because Emerson had to pay U.S. taxes on 
Schneider’s non-U.S. earnings at nearly 40 percent 
(including both federal and state taxes), whereas 
Schneider would be taxed at less than 2 percent on 
those same earnings.162 In Galvin’s opinion, France’s 
territorial tax system, coupled with the U.S. 
worldwide tax system, made it possible for 
Schneider to outbid Emerson for APC. Kleinbard 
strongly disagrees.
Kleinbard’s responses to Galvin’s claim fall into 
four broad categories. First, Kleinbard argues that 
there are alternative nontax justifications for why 
Schneider might outbid Emerson.163 Second, he 
argues that the difference in bid prices is so large that 
it cannot be explained by taxes.164 Third, he contends 
that Emerson’s competitiveness argument is 
misplaced because APC was a U.S. corporation at the 
time of its acquisition.165 Fourth, Kleinbard wryly 
notes that shortly after its failure to acquire APC, 
Emerson was able to acquire a different (foreign) 
corporation.166 I address each of these arguments in 
turn.
First, Kleinbard maintains that Schneider outbid 
Emerson for APC because Schneider had a young, 
ambitious president and because APC was likely a 
better strategic fit with Schneider than with 
Emerson.167 Those are certainly plausible explanations. 
However, in all actual corporate acquisitions, there are 
likely to be nontax differences across competing 
bidders. The possibility of those differences alone does 
not undercut the claim that taxes can have an effect on 
which corporation acquires any particular company.
Second, Kleinbard contends that the 
difference between Schneider’s and Emerson’s 
global ETRs are not nearly large enough to 
account for the difference in bid prices. As 
described by Kleinbard, APC’s global ETR was 26 
percent in 2003, 25 percent in 2004, and 22 percent 
in 2003.168 Schneider’s French GAAP global ETR 
was “a bit higher, in the 28 to 29 percent range.”169 
Throughout the same period, Emerson’s 
companywide ETR was higher still, “close to the 
statutory 35 percent rate.”170 According to 
Kleinbard, “on its face, this 20 percent difference 
in the offers that the two firms made is an 
implausibly large premium to attribute to tax rate 
differentials.”171
Fair enough. Nonetheless, the difference 
between Schneider’s and Emerson’s global ETRs 
potentially translates into a large difference in 
valuation. Assuming that both companies made 
their investment decisions using their global ETRs 
(the only tax rates Kleinbard discusses regarding 
the transaction), Emerson would use a 35 percent 
tax rate, and Schneider would use, say, a 28.5 
percent rate, the midpoint between 28 and 29 
percent. Thus, Schneider would expect to report 
to its shareholders on an after-tax financial 
accounting basis 71.5 percent of APC’s earnings. 
Emerson, in contrast, would expect to report only 
65 percent of APC’s earnings. Thus, applying each 
potential acquirer’s global ETR to APC’s earnings, 
Schneider would report 6.5 cents (or 10 percent) 
more of after-tax earnings than would Emerson 
on every dollar earned by APC.172 Assuming both 
companies used the same discount rate to value 
the same investments (a common assumption 
because it isolates tax effects), Schneider would 
place a 10 percent higher value on the same pretax 
162
Galvin, supra note 10, as quoted in Kleinbard, supra note 17, 
at 1061-1062.
163
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1063-1064.
164
Id. at 1063.
165
Id. at 1064.
166
Id. at 1065.
167
Id. at 1064.
168
Id. at 1063.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 1062.
171
Id. at 1063.
172
For every dollar earned by APC, Schneider would report 
after-tax earnings of 71.5 cents, whereas Emerson would report 
only 65 cents.
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earnings than would Emerson. That difference is 
insufficient to account for the full difference in bid 
prices (20 percent), and it does not equal the 
statutory difference in rates (nearly 40 percent), 
but a 10 percent difference in valuation is certainly 
substantial.
Although Kleinbard might be correct that 
taxes cannot account for the full difference in bid 
prices between Schneider and Emerson, he would 
be wrong about the general proposition that U.S. 
companies are in as good a position as their 
foreign rivals in the competition to acquire other 
corporations. Thus, viewed through the lens of 
global ETRs, the APC example shows, if anything, 
that Emerson was at a large tax disadvantage 
relative to Schneider.
Of course, the above discussion focused 
exclusively on global ETRs. If we looked at 
Emerson’s and Schneider’s jurisdiction-specific 
ETRs or MTRs, we might reach very different 
results. However, we do not know what those 
were, and Kleinbard does not discuss the 
possibilities. Moreover, we do not know how 
Emerson and Schneider incorporated taxes into 
their valuation processes, so we do not know 
what tax rates they used to value APC.
Third, Kleinbard points out that APC was not 
a foreign-domiciled corporation but rather a U.S.-
domiciled corporation, so Schneider, by 
purchasing Emerson rather than removing APC’s 
earnings from the ambit of U.S. taxation instead 
further entwined itself in the U.S. tax system. 
Although APC’s U.S. domicile complicates the 
argument that Emerson was at a tax 
disadvantage, APC’s U.S. domicile alone does not 
rebut the claim that Schneider had a tax 
advantage over Emerson. For the reasons 
described above, APC’s (future) foreign earnings 
and cash flow might be more valuable to 
Schneider than to Emerson. Also, APC’s (future) 
U.S. earnings and cash flow might be more 
valuable to Schneider because it might have been 
better able to strip earnings out of the United 
States than Emerson.
Fourth and finally, Kleinbard’s coup de grace 
is to point out that four years after Emerson’s 
unsuccessful attempt to acquire APC, it acquired 
Chloride Group, a U.K. corporation, outbidding 
ABB, a Swiss-domiciled corporation. Kleinbard 
argues that Emerson’s 2010 acquisition of 
Chloride shows that U.S.-based MNCs are not 
disadvantaged, because they can acquire foreign 
firms.173 Of course, it is no more reasonable to 
conclude from Emerson’s failure to acquire APC 
that U.S.-based MNCs are at a tax-induced 
competitive disadvantage than it is to conclude 
the opposite — that because Emerson acquired 
Chloride, U.S.-based MNCs are not at a 
disadvantage — which is precisely Kleinbard’s 
point.
Kleinbard, however, misses an important 
difference (at least in Galvin’s telling) between the 
APC and Chloride transactions. At the time they 
were acquired, Chloride was a much smaller 
company than APC. Emerson acquired Chloride 
for $1.5 billion, whereas Schneider acquired APC 
for $6 billion. According to Galvin, Emerson 
acquired Chloride using offshore cash. That cash, 
which would have been subject to tax upon 
repatriation, was not fully available for Emerson 
to use as it liked. Instead, it was locked offshore, 
which means that it was subject to an ongoing cost 
(explicit or implicit) that would not apply if the 
income had been repatriated. The implication is 
that offshore cash is a cheaper form of financing 
overseas acquisitions for U.S.-based MNCs, 
whereas new equity and U.S. cash are more 
expensive forms of financing. There is thus no 
logical inconsistency in Galvin’s claim that the 
U.S. tax system makes it more difficult for U.S.-
based MNCs to make large overseas acquisitions 
but easier for them to make small ones. The two 
arguments are the opposite sides of the same coin.
Because of deferral, the debate whether the 
U.S. tax system disadvantages U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs in foreign markets comes down to whether 
it is costly for U.S. MNCs to hold cash in their 
foreign subsidiaries. If there is no cost, there is no 
disadvantage, because cash held by foreign 
subsidiaries is as valuable as cash held by the 
domestic parent (and its U.S. affiliates). If, 
however, overseas cash is subject to explicit or 
implicit taxation, U.S.-domiciled MNCs are at a 
tax disadvantage when they are looking to invest 
U.S. cash overseas, because they will incur the 
added cost of earning overseas cash that their 
foreign rivals will not. In other words, parent 
173
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1064-1065.
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
(C
) T
ax A
nalysts 2017. A
ll rights reserved. T
ax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
SPECIAL REPORT
TAX NOTES, MAY 1, 2017  649
company financing (U.S. cash or new equity of the 
U.S. parent) is a relatively expensive source of 
capital for U.S. MNCs’ overseas investments 
because if the investment succeeds, there is an 
incremental cost that non-U.S. MNCs do not 
incur. Conversely, because the cash held by the 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs is subject to 
explicit taxation or to the implicit cost of deferring 
taxation, U.S. MNCs’ overseas cash provides a 
relatively inexpensive source of capital for 
acquisitions. Thus, Galvin’s claims about APC 
and Chloride are not contradictory (although they 
are not established and backed up by Galvin, 
either), so Chloride (without more) is not the 
counterpoint Kleinbard takes it to be.
Viewed through the only lens into the 
acquisition of APC that Kleinbard provides — 
global ETRs — Galvin’s story is broadly 
supported by Kleinbard’s data and comments. 
Although Schneider’s global ETR was not so 
much lower than Emerson’s to account for the full 
20 percent difference in bid prices, the difference 
in global ETRs could account for a 10 percent 
difference, half of the bid price difference. Also, 
from a cash flow perspective, Chloride’s 
substantially smaller size than APC (as well as 
Chloride’s foreign domicile) is consistent with the 
notion that new cash or equity is an expensive 
acquisition currency, whereas preexisting, 
untaxed offshore cash is an inexpensive currency.
D. Other Explanations for Inversions
Kleinbard rejects the idea that U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs invert to improve their competitiveness 
because, according to Kleinbard, U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs are not at a disadvantage relative to their 
foreign rivals. Instead, Kleinbard offers two 
alternative justifications for inversions.174
Kleinbard believes the principal reason why 
U.S. MNCs invert is that they are seeking to gain 
access to their large offshore stores of cash.175 As 
he describes it:
The best of the stateless income planners 
are drowning in low-taxed overseas cash, 
which today earns only negligible rates of 
interest. The meager earnings on the cash 
drag down earnings per share, while 
shareholders focus with laser intensity on 
that cash as more usefully deployed 
directly in their hands.
It is less than a secret that firms in this 
position really have no intention at all of 
“permanently” reinvesting the cash 
overseas, but instead are counting the 
days until the money can be used to goose 
share prices through stock buybacks and 
dividends.176
Thus, according to Kleinbard, U.S. MNCs are 
engaging in inversions to put their hands on their 
large overseas stocks of low-taxed and untaxed 
cash so they can use those funds to repurchase 
shares and raise their stock price.
Although Kleinbard offers accessing offshore 
stockpiles of cash as an alternative to improving 
competitiveness as a justification for inversions, the 
two justifications are not as far apart as they might at 
first seem. In fact, the two justifications are closely 
related. The connection is perhaps easiest to see by 
examining the outbound argument. In the 
outbound argument, the claim is that companies 
invert because they seek to reduce the tax burden on 
their future overseas earnings; in Kleinbard’s 
accessing cash argument, companies invert to access 
prior earnings held offshore. Thus, both arguments 
are predicated on the value of reaching earnings 
held offshore, which are worth more to the 
company, its managers, and investors when they 
can be freely accessed without additional tax cost. 
The difference is that Kleinbard’s argument focuses 
on those earnings only after they have been earned. 
In contrast, the competitiveness argument takes a 
step back in time and recognizes that before those 
earnings are earned, they will be worth more if they 
can be accessed immediately or whenever desired 
without having to incur a repatriation tax.177
174
I consider only Kleinbard’s economic justifications. 
Kleinbard notes that there can also be psychological motivations 
for undertaking a transaction such as an inversion, but he prefers to 
focus on the economic rationales rather than psychological 
motives. Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1066-1067.
175
Id. at 1065-1066.
176
Id.
177
The same relationship holds for the inbound argument. 
Kleinbard argues that U.S. MNCs strip income out of the United 
States and into low-tax jurisdictions and that U.S. MNCs invert to 
access prior earnings without additional tax. According to the 
inbound competitiveness argument, U.S. MNCs invert to access 
their future U.S. earnings more easily and cheaply.
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Of course, competitiveness arguments for 
inversions and Kleinbard’s principal reason for 
inversions are not in conflict. It is possible that by 
changing domicile, inverting companies are 
trying to both access past earnings with minimal 
tax cost and reduce the tax cost on their future 
earnings. Indeed, the two reasons are closely 
related. Both are derived from the U.S. worldwide 
tax system, which reduces the value to U.S.-
domiciled MNCs of earnings held overseas 
relative to the value those earnings have to MNCs 
domiciled in territorial states. Because untaxed 
earnings held overseas are worth less to U.S.-
domiciled MNCs than to MNCs domiciled in 
territorial jurisdictions, U.S.-domiciled MNCs 
have an incentive to invert: so they can realize the 
full value of their accumulated overseas earnings 
without taxation.178 Similarly, U.S. MNCs that 
expect to have large overseas earnings in the 
future also have an incentive to invert: so they can 
realize the full value of their expected future 
earnings without taxation.
Accordingly, I do not disagree with Kleinbard 
that gaining access to large amounts of overseas 
cash is one reason why U.S. MNCs invert. 
However, gaining access to previously untaxed 
offshore cash is not the only reason why 
companies seek to invert. After all, not all 
inverting companies already hold large offshore 
stocks of cash, and some high-profile proposed 
inversions, such as Walgreen’s aborted inversion, 
involve companies with little offshore cash.179
That leads to Kleinbard’s second reason for 
why U.S. firms engage in inversions:
The other reason for the wave of inversions 
relates to the same existential despair over 
the failure of Congress to engage with 
fundamental corporate tax reform, but this 
time the focus shifts to the tax imposed on 
U.S. domestic income. Many domestic-
centric U.S. firms, particularly those in the 
services industries — say, a large chain of 
retail drugstores — actually pay federal 
corporate tax at effective rates not that far 
removed from the statutory rate. 
Companies in this situation have every 
reason to feel aggrieved that Congress has 
not addressed the high statutory rate, which 
burdens them disproportionately. An 
inversion transaction does little for those 
firms regarding their offshore cash, because 
they typically have little or none in a tax 
haven kitty, but the creation of an offshore 
parent located in a tax treaty jurisdiction 
does permit easy earnings stripping of the 
U.S. tax base on domestic operating income 
through newly created internal leverage, up 
to the ceiling set by section 163(j). But that 
ceiling is far too high, because it basically 
allows firms to strip out 50 percent of their 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization. After depreciation and 
amortization reduce what remains, there are 
slim pickings left for the U.S. Treasury.180
Thus, Kleinbard argues that the second reason 
why U.S. MNCs are inverting is so they can shift 
income that would otherwise be taxed in the 
United States to lower-taxed jurisdictions.181 That 
is not a backward-looking rationale for 
inversions, as was the rationale Kleinbard offered 
regarding foreign markets. Instead, that is a 
forward-looking account, which provides a 
rationale for companies to invert in order to 
reduce their effective taxes on future earnings. 
This second rationale is a surprising reason for 
inversions for Kleinbard to offer in a piece 
promoting the idea that tax inversions are 
unrelated to competitiveness. That is because that 
rationale is what I describe as the inbound 
competitiveness rationale for inversions.182
In summary, Kleinbard, in an article that 
purports to debunk the claim that U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs undertake inversions to improve their 
178
Indeed, the block quote in which Kleinbard puts forth the 
accessing cash rationale is full of language similar to the language 
from the cash flow argument that worldwide taxation 
disadvantages U.S. MNCs. Thus, Kleinbard talks of U.S. MNCs 
holding cash “that earns only negligible rates of interest” that 
“drag down earnings per share” to the detriment of shareholders 
who recognize that such cash could be “more usefully deployed 
directly in their hands.” Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1066.
179
Felipe Cortes et al., “The Effect of Inversions on Corporate 
Governance” (Oct. 25, 2016).
180
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1065-1066.
181
Id. at 1066.
182
Kleinbard, however, would seem to acknowledge this 
possibility for U.S. corporations without substantial overseas 
operations. Whether he also maintains that U.S.-domiciled 
companies can reduce their taxes on U.S. income when the 
company already has substantial foreign operations is not clear.
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competitiveness, offers two alternative 
justifications to account for inversions. The 
opposition between his proffered rationales for 
inversions and the standard competitiveness 
arguments is not as sharp as Kleinbard apparently 
thinks. One of his justifications is a straight-
forward statement of the inbound account (from 
either a financial accounting or cash flow 
perspective), and the other is very close to the cash 
flow version of the outbound account. The latter 
differs from the outbound account in that 
Kleinbard considers only previously earned 
stocks of untaxed and undertaxed income, 
ignoring the value from accumulating untaxed 
and undertaxed income in the future.
IV. Conclusion
Kleinbard’s principal thesis in his 2014 article 
is that inversions are in no way motivated by a 
desire to improve the competitiveness of U.S.-
domiciled MNCs, because U.S.-domiciled MNCs 
are not at a tax-induced competitive disadvantage 
relative to their non-U.S. rivals. According to 
Kleinbard, the U.S. worldwide tax system does 
not disadvantage U.S. MNCs relative to their 
foreign rivals domiciled in states with territorial 
tax systems, and hence they cannot eliminate any 
tax-induced disadvantage by inverting. As 
described above, that claim implies that U.S.-
domiciled MNCs are not disadvantaged relative 
to their foreign rivals from either a financial 
accounting perspective or a cash flow perspective 
in the competition to earn income in either foreign 
markets or the domestic market.
However, the data and studies available, 
either today or in 2014 when Kleinbard published 
his article, do not establish that U.S.-domiciled 
MNCs are not disadvantaged relative to their 
foreign rivals from either a financial accounting 
(global ETR) or a cash flow perspective in either 
foreign or domestic markets. The data are at best 
inconclusive. Most of the data, in fact, are 
consistent with and support the opposite view 
regarding the competitive disadvantage of U.S.-
domiciled MNCs and thus the view that they can 
improve their competitive position by inverting. 
Moreover, Emerson’s unsuccessful attempt to 
acquire APC is not a “competitiveness fable” but 
an illustration of the powerful impact taxes can 
have on competitiveness. And finally, Kleinbard’s 
alternative justifications for inversions do not 
undercut the outbound and inbound 
competitiveness arguments but in fact support 
those claims.
Accordingly, despite Kleinbard’s claim that 
competitiveness has nothing to do with 
inversions, improving competitiveness remains a 
strong reason for U.S.-domiciled companies to 
invert. Although improving competitiveness 
might not be the only reason to invert (and we do 
not have a good sense of the magnitude of the 
advantage), improving competitiveness is and 
remains a powerful motivation for inverting. And 
policies intended to curb inversions that ignore 
this state of affairs are likely to create tensions and 
produce adverse effects. 
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